Some kids are worth less: the neoliberal politics of indirect social spending by Connors, Bayley
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Boston University Theses & Dissertations
2020
Some kids are worth less: the


















SOME KIDS ARE WORTH LESS:  
 





















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
 
requirements for the degree of 
 








































© 2020 by 
 BAYLEY CONNORS 









First Reader   
 Cathie Jo Martin, Ph.D. 






Second Reader   
 Dino P. Christenson, Ph.D. 















“There can be no keener revelation of a society’s soul than the way in which it treats its 















Professor Cathie Jo Martin had a profound impact on my academic career at Boston 
University. Despite taking a sabbatical during the spring of 2020, she signed on to advise 
this project. Thank you, Professor Martin, for reading endless draft pages on flights and 
in the basements of archives. Without you, this thesis could not have happened.  
  
I changed my major from chemistry to political science after only two lectures of 
Professor Spencer Piston’s Introduction to Public Policy course. Professor Piston not only 
redirected my studies, but also enriched them with endless insight into social science 
research. He provided crucial advice on this project, particularly with regard to its survey 
experiment.  
 
Were it not for my family, I never would have had the privilege of participating in higher 
education. I would like to thank my mother, a public kindergarten teacher, who reminds 
me that one person can change a child’s world just by believing in them. I would like to 
thank my father, a detective, who keeps me grounded in reality. Finally, I would like to 
thank my two younger sisters, who put up with me.  
 
I also would like to express my appreciation to the Kilachand Honors College and 




SOME KIDS ARE WORTH LESS: 




The child tax credit (CTC) is the largest anti-child poverty policy in the United 
States, but it gives more benefits to upper-income households than it does to lower-
income households. Meanwhile, traditional cash benefit welfare programs like 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) have shrunk over the past two decades. 
Why have American policymakers approached child poverty with indirect rather than 
direct spending solutions? This thesis argues that neoliberalism, defined as the reliance of 
policymakers on market means to achieve public goals, is to blame. Historical case 
comparisons between TANF and the CTC demonstrate that policymakers utilize 
neoliberal code words implicitly to divide target populations into deserving and 
undeserving groups. Additionally, an original survey experiment finds that political 
actors can increase public support for regressive economic agendas by incorporating 
indirect social spending into their legislation. Ultimately, neoliberal values challenge our 
conception of what constitutes good politics and good policy. It is clear that direct 
spending solutions to child poverty are present and available, but their attainability is 
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Upon first look, the DREAM Program seems like any other summer activity for 
children. Kids crowd the neighborhood basketball court and playground with games of 
tag, shrieks of laughter, and Styrofoam cups of ice cream. Surrounding them, however, 
are the trademarks of poverty. Closed toe shoes are on every pair of feet, protecting them 
from broken hypodermic needles littering the park. The children arrive with gossip each 
morning, sharing stories of overdoses they witnessed the night before on the court and in 
their streets. The neglect experienced by the community is palpable. Nevertheless, 
Charlotte, a pseudonym for a seven-year-old girl, inexplicably persists. She emits endless 
energy and shares a contagious laugh, but quick glances at her protruding joints inform us 
she is underfed. Counselors ensure that she always goes home with a backpack full of 
food; her sister, old enough to feel misplaced pride, denies a similar offer. Despite 
working, their parents cannot afford to keep their pantry stocked. Neither can they afford 
a child tax credit (CTC), the largest anti-child poverty benefit in the nation. Meanwhile, 
affluent families in the suburbs receive the credit in full.  
Why leave one child out of the fight against poverty in exchange for another? 
Half of American children live in low-income households and nearly one out of five 
under the age of six lives in poverty.1 In response, the U.S. welfare state provides certain 
families with the CTC, a one-time annual payment delivered by the tax code. Although it 
                                                        
1 Fontenot, Semega, and Kollar, “Income and Poverty in the United States: 2017,” 13; Semega et al., 




is the largest anti-child poverty policy in the country, the CTC is upwardly redistributive. 
In 2018, beneficiaries in the highest income quartile received $900 more on average from 
the CTC than did beneficiaries in the lowest income quartile.2 Families with incomes 
below $2,500 did not benefit at all, despite the reality that five million children live in 
households surviving on less than nine dollars per day per person.3 It does not take a 
graduate degree to realize that this will not end child poverty. 
The American welfare state has not always addressed the issue in this way. From 
the Great Depression to the mid-1990s, direct cash payments were given to low-income 
parents through a program known as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). 
At the turn of the century, AFDC was defunded and transformed into Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). It now operates on a $16.5 billion annual budget. 
In comparison, the CTC will cost over half a trillion dollars between 2018 and 2022.4 
Why did policymakers abandon a direct approach to child poverty in favor of an indirect 
one? This thesis argues that neoliberalism is to blame. Neoliberalism is conventionally 
defined as an economic term, but this thesis joins a growing body of literature in viewing 
it as an overarching framework of our modern political economy.5 It is defined here as 
the reliance of policymakers on market means to achieve public goals.  
Specifically, this thesis argues that neoliberalism serves two functions for political 
actors. First, as demonstrated through a historical case comparison of TANF and the 
                                                        
2 Urban Institute & Brookings Institution, “Can Poor Families Benefit from the Child Tax Credit?” 
3 Dawson, “Child Poverty.” 
4 The Joint Committee on Taxation, “Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2018-2022,” 
29. 
5 Brown, In the Ruins of Neoliberalism; Hall, Massey, and Rustin, “After Neoliberalism?”; Soss, Fording, 




CTC, politicians use neoliberal code words to suggest whether a beneficiary is deserving 
of a benefit. Through each instance of CTC reform, policymakers on both ends of the 
political spectrum emphasize that the credit is reserved only for “hardworking American 
families.” One’s income is used by politicians as a measurement for hard work, as 
families with large earnings are perceived to have a productive relationship with the 
market. The separation of target populations thus reaffirms the cultural norm of hard 
work but undermines the goal of the American safety net, which is to ensure an equitable 
standard of living for all.  
Second, garnering evidence from an original survey experiment, this thesis claims 
that neoliberal values allow politicians to increase public support for regressive economic 
agendas. Legislation containing tax cuts for the wealthy can be reframed as anti-child 
poverty policy if it incorporates the CTC. This has been witnessed on several real world 
occasions. The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA, or the 
“Bush tax cuts”) of 2001 and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 both provide 
wealthy Americans and corporations with historic tax cuts. They also converge on their 
significant expansions of the child tax credit. One could argue that these expansions are 
coincidental, but this thesis views them as strategically placed. It becomes much more 
difficult to oppose a bill if it appears to lift children out of poverty. 
Overall, neoliberal values have changed the terrain on which political battles are 
fought. They have rationalized the exclusion of a visibly emaciated girl like Charlotte 
from the nation’s largest anti-child poverty policy. In the name of economic growth, 




during struggles over partisan agendas. These facets are lost on many Americans, as 
policymakers continue to be rewarded electorally for taking symbolic action on a major 
social crisis. It is true that the CTC significantly decreases the poverty rate; however, it 
does so by placing a dollar amount on each child. Not all are worth much and many are 
worthless. The consequences of this reality appear not only in the tax code, but also in the 
daily lives of children as they interact with the institutions of a society that values their 
economic worth above all else.   
After a brief review of the literature surrounding social policymaking, this thesis 
turns to an in-depth study of the child tax credit. Chapter 2 introduces the empirical 
puzzle of a transition from AFDC to the CTC. It then presents each case study along with 
its relevant methodology. Chapter 3 introduces the public opinion dimension of 
neoliberal politics before presenting the methodology and findings of an original survey 
experiment. Finally, Chapter 4 consists of a conclusion that addresses straightforward 
solutions to child poverty. It will be clear that although direct spending solutions to this 
issue are present and available, neoliberal values have falsely shrouded their attainability 
in clouds of skepticism.  
Literature Review 
The Child Tax Credit: Market-Oriented Welfare 
Much of the United States social welfare system exists in the tax code. Although 
popular wisdom views welfare as means-tested cash payments, academia has largely 
abandoned this narrow perception. In his seminal work on the hidden welfare state, 




includes tax expenditures.6 While tax cuts and credits do not always provide direct cash 
benefits, they lower tax liabilities for millions of Americans and cost the government 
trillions of dollars in revenue on an annual basis. This thesis joins the mainstream 
literature in viewing welfare not as cash benefits to the poor, but rather as intentional 
revenue loss with social aims.  
Today, tax expenditures are a mainstay of the American policymaking process. 
The child tax credit, for example, will alone cost an estimated $595.2 billion between 
fiscal years 2018 and 2022.7 In comparison, all tax expenditures with social welfare 
objectives combined tallied only $400 billion in 1995. When social welfare oriented tax 
expenditures are considered in a cross-comparison analysis of welfare states, the United 
States appears in the upper-third of affluent nations – above the Netherlands.8 It is clear 
that the largest American welfare program is the United States tax code. This analysis has 
been accepted by most scholars, with several moving on to explore the implications of a 
divided or submerged welfare state.9 Nonetheless, one may still argue that tax 
expenditures should not be placed in the same realm as welfare benefits.  
This argument is out of touch. The Republican-led Joint Committee on Taxation 
itself claims that tax expenditures are “analogous to direct outlay programs and may be 
considered alternative means of accomplishing similar budget policy objectives.” More 
explicitly, the committee views tax expenditures as “similar to direct spending programs 
                                                        
6 Howard, The Hidden Welfare State. 
7 The Joint Committee on Taxation, “Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2018-2022,” 
29. 
8 Howard, The Welfare State Nobody Knows, 24–25. 





that function as entitlements.”10 As such, the manner in which this thesis interprets social 
welfare policy is in line not only with contemporary academia, but also with the present 
government. The focus may now turn to the inequities that arise from using tax 
expenditures as social policymaking tools, with several of their implications proving 
counterintuitive to the principles of a welfare state. 
 Taxation in the United States is progressive, as tax liabilities rise alongside 
income. Any benefit that offsets a liability must therefore be regressive unless 
specifically designed otherwise. Because tax credits serve to reduce an individual’s tax 
liability, they generally do not benefit those who lack a liability all together. As a result, 
promoting social goals through the tax code does not address those with meager to no 
incomes, who arguably are most in need of social welfare benefits. While this causes tax 
credits to yield inequality by design, the degree to which they exacerbate economic 
inequities depends on their classification. Whereas a non-refundable tax credit largely 
excludes low-income earners, refundable tax credits are able to reach those with little to 
no tax liabilities.   
 All tax credits operate as a dollar-for-dollar reduction in one’s tax liability. 
However, if a credit is non-refundable, then the difference between the credit and the 
liability is lost by the beneficiary. If a credit is refundable, then the beneficiary receives 
the difference in the form of a check from the government. For example, if a taxpayer 
owes $200 in taxes, a $500 non-refundable tax credit would yield a $200 benefit by 
                                                        





reducing their liability to $0. A $500 refundable tax credit, in contrast, would reduce the 
liability to $0 and then return the $300 difference in the form of a cash benefit. Inequality 
is inherent in the design of non-refundable credits, as upper-income earners with large 
liabilities are likely to receive the benefit in full. 
 Despite this, political actors shifted their approach to child poverty from a direct 
spending program to a non-refundable tax credit at the turn of the century. Why do they 
continue to address poverty through policy tools known to breed inequity? Several 
scholars point to longstanding features within the policymaking process that favor 
indirect over direct spending initiatives. However, these features offer an incomplete 
picture. Additionally, such features have remained constant across time and thus do not 
explain why an abrupt transition occurred when it did. This thesis engages with the 
shortcomings in current explanations before presenting how neoliberal values allow 
American policymakers to fight poverty with tax cuts. The neoliberal dimension of tax 
expenditures is a powerful tool for policymakers who seek to shape family policy in a 
manner that includes some households and excludes others.  
Which Kids Get What, When, and How 
It is accepted as a natural reality in the United States that not all kids receive a 
high-quality education, eat a breakfast every morning, or have somewhere to go after 
school. Meanwhile, nearly two-trillion dollars have been spent on the child tax credit in 
just twenty years.11 Although this revenue loss is similarly accepted as normal, it calls 
                                                        




into question whether child poverty is so much a natural phenomenon as it is a choice. 
Why did American policymakers funnel two-trillion dollars through the tax code and not 
directly into households struggling to make ends meet? Contemporary scholars offer 
several explanations, but each alone paints only part of the picture.  
Several institutional advantages facilitate the passage of indirect spending 
programs. Whereas direct spending programs are achieved via new legislation that may 
never receive a vote, tax expenditures are simply added to revenue bills that must be 
taken up by Congress.12 Additionally, indirect programs are authorized and funded by a 
single congressional committee. On the other hand, direct spending programs must be 
authorized by one committee and funded by another, allowing for multiple veto points. 
Scholars may overestimate the influence of this advantage, however, as tax expenditures 
must still be approved by both houses of Congress and the President. This ensures 
multiple veto points for both types of spending. Instead, the most advantageous quality 
held by tax expenditures resides with their symbolic versatility.  
Despite large public battles over deficits, tax expenditures managed to expand 
with bipartisan support throughout the late twentieth century. Howard claims that this is 
because they were able to “grow without advocacy” for an inordinate amount of time.13 
A major reason for this lies within the political ambiguity of tax expenditures. Whereas a 
direct spending program and its beneficiaries are visible, the dynamics of indirect 
spending programs lie beneath the surface of government bureaucracy. Tax credits can 
                                                        
12 Howard, The Hidden Welfare State, 178. 




mean something different to each person, playing into what Deborah Stone refers to as 
“strategic representation.”14 Some may view them as assistance to the poor, while others 
can view them as rewards for behavior displayed by the middle and upper classes. This 
flexibility in meaning allows for a broad coalition of support from both ends of the 
political spectrum.  
What Howard and Stone neglect, however, is whether this flexibility extends onto 
the target populations of indirect spending programs. The social construction of target 
populations arises from the values, images, and symbols placed on the shared qualities 
that define a group of beneficiaries. The perceptions of populations are formed at the 
intersection of two dimensions: construction, measured to be either positive or negative, 
and political power, measured to be either strong or weak. Anne Schneider and Helen 
Ingram use this intersection to establish four classes of target populations, including the 
advantaged, contenders, dependents, and deviants.15 The authors contend that these 
classes follow target populations throughout the policymaking process, affecting their 
benefits, burdens, and participation in democracy.  
However, the authors also acknowledge a severe limitation to their typology. In 
their categorization, families and children are classified as dependents with weak political 
power but positive social constructions. Within the politics of the child tax credit, this is 
not the case. Only some parents are viewed positively; others, who earn little income, are 
better aligned with the deviant social construction. Schneider and Ingram account for 
                                                        
14 Stone, Policy Paradox. 




potential subdivisions such as this, saying, “Political debates may lead elected officials to 
make finer and finer distinctions, thereby subdividing a particular group into those who 
are deserving and those who are not.”16 Nonetheless, citing the difficulty with which it 
takes to gain the perspective of elected officials, the authors assume that parents and 
children are viewed as dependents by political actors. This thesis addresses such a 
shortcoming by gaining the perspective of elected officials directly from their rhetoric. It 
will be seen that not all children are depicted in the same way and some are indeed made 
out to be deviants.  
The key role of political ambiguity put forth by Howard and Stone thus not only 
affects the characterization of policy, but also the construction of target populations. 
While means-tested welfare programs benefit a defined population, the beneficiaries of 
indirect spending programs are dispersed. Those who benefited from the child tax credit 
in 2018, for example, ranged from $2,500 to $400,000 in annual household incomes. 
Such a diverse group of beneficiaries may appear difficult to characterize without making 
explicit references to their incomes, but neoliberalism provides a way for politicians to do 
so implicitly. As will be seen in the coming chapters, political actors are able to frame 
certain populations as deserving and others as underserving by priming their social 
constructions with neoliberal rhetoric. 
 Famously, politics is about who gets what, when, and how.17 In the realm of 
social welfare policymaking, the “who” component is integral to policy design. It has 
                                                        
16 Schneider and Ingram, 336. 




been traditionally thought that political actors must extend benefits to groups that are 
positively constructed by the public. This dynamic has been quietly challenged in the 
politics of child poverty. While it may appear as though political actors are championing 
families and lifting children out of poverty, they are doing so only symbolically. The 
child tax credit is extended only to those deemed worthy, and those who are unworthy are 
forced to prove their deservingness upon a neoliberal political landscape. While indirect 
spending solutions to child poverty are buttressed by institutional and political 
advantages, neoliberal values are the main causal mechanism behind their embrace 
during the late twentieth century.  
Neoliberalism and Child Poverty 
Neoliberalism as an economic ideology has already gained conventional 
consensus. The literature surrounding it refers to fiscal austerity, the cutting of social 
programs, and the privatization of services traditionally provided by the government. 
While this outline is accurate, it does not account for the influence that neoliberalism 
holds on the policymaking process itself in the United States. This thesis defines 
neoliberalism as the reliance of policymakers on market means to achieve public goals. 
The political overtone of this choice is intentional. It frames neoliberal values not as 
natural facets of the market, but rather as human-made policymaking tools that can be 
manipulated by political actors to shift and undermine agendas. This perspective is in line 
with a growing field of literature that views neoliberalism as the bedrock of the 




 Cures for child poverty arguably exist and are readily attainable. In fact, they will 
be discussed at length throughout the conclusion of this thesis. A cynical viewpoint in the 
literature, however, claims that political actors know this and have instead focused on 
governing the poor, not lifting them. Joe Soss and colleagues illustrate that the concept of 
poverty governance can be traced alongside the historical rise of paternalism and 
neoliberalism; or, operating in tandem, neoliberal paternalism. As paternalism introduced 
a direct and supervisory approach to fighting poverty, neoliberalism restructured the state 
so that policy authority became decentralized and outsourced to the private market. The 
goal of policymakers subsequently shifted from ending poverty to creating new 
mentalities of rule, wherein governing practices are altered by reshaping how authorities 
view themselves, their mission, and the problems faced by the populations they are 
serving.18 More importantly, this alteration trickles downward to the constituencies that 
political actors represent.  
 Long-lasting alterations on individual psyches have been made over the past four 
decades. Similar to Soss et al., Wendy Brown views neoliberalism not as an ideology but 
as a normative order and governing rationality. The individual and the state, Brown 
argues, have been reoriented around economic and market values. Neoliberalism 
“formulates everything, everywhere, in terms of capital investment and appreciation, 
including and especially humans themselves.”19 The evidence for this claim can be found 
in nearly every domain of public policy. Higher education, for example, has been 
                                                        
18 Soss, Fording, and Schram, Disciplining the Poor Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of 
Race, 8–9. 




undermined by the neoliberal economization of its goals and principles. Rather than 
aiming to educate students, universities view themselves as a business that provides a 
product to a consumer. In turn, students view themselves as investing in their earning 
capacities and expect returns on investment.20 No longer is education seen in the 
mainstream as a public and social good to be guaranteed to all. It has quietly transformed 
from a right to a privilege.  
 Political actors on both sides sharpen these shifts. For example, President Barack 
Obama often framed his legislative agenda in neoliberal rhetoric. No matter the issue, 
whether it was protecting Medicare, raising the minimum wage, or fighting domestic 
violence, the President emphasized it in relation to economic growth and 
competitiveness.21 How we discuss and frame public policy matters. Currently, common 
language used in daily life positions our interactions, responsibilities, and relationships 
around the market. Doreen Massey argues that neoliberalism has created “vocabularies of 
the economy,” wherein our conceptions of the world and ourselves have been reduced to 
economic values. Massey identifies frequently used words that shape our diction, 
including “wealth, output, growth, and work.”22 These terms frame the intentions of 
public policy in market expressions. The child tax credit itself is described as an 
investment in the economy, not as a policy that fights child poverty. 
The neoliberal mindset that arises from this vocabulary affects the underpinnings 
of contemporary legislation and legal decisions, tethering the value of almost everything 
                                                        
20 Brown, 181. 
21 Brown, 25. 




in the political landscape to economic worth. Ultimately, such constructions change 
citizenship itself. The neoliberal citizen is deemed good only if they are willing to 
sacrifice their own condition for the betterment of economic growth, competitiveness, 
and fiscal responsibility.23 With regard to the politics of indirect social spending, 
assistance is granted only by virtue of being a responsible neoliberal subject, not by 
virtue of being a citizen.  
The rise of the child tax credit amidst this neoliberal backdrop makes sense. 
Throughout the 1990s, traditional cash benefit welfare programs were under siege for 
allegedly discouraging work and marriage. As neoliberal paternalism reoriented public 
initiatives, political actors sought to govern the poor instead of lift them. The CTC, which 
incentivizes work and marriage by most benefiting affluent married households, was a 
natural manifestation of growing neoliberal sentiments. The time in America when 
politicians can openly discriminate without electoral consequence against certain 
populations may be fading, but it is being replaced by a time when politicians can 
implicitly divide populations via their relationship to the market. The vocabulary of 
neoliberalism makes this possible to the extent where our orientation around market 






                                                        





Distributing Welfare in America 
Benefitting from traditional direct spending programs in the United States 
requires effort. A single low-income mother, for example, may have to visit an 
administrative office if she wants to apply for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. 
Once there, she meets with a caseworker who has a vast portfolio to manage and little 
time to give. She is asked a range of personal questions relating to her sexual relations, 
relationship with the father, and capacity to find a job. Stigma pierces the air. Ultimately, 
if deemed qualifying, she receives a meager monthly payment. Contingent on her 
remaining impoverished, the benefit is guaranteed for up to two years at a time. 
Alternatively, wealthy parents can claim thousands of dollars every year from tax 
expenditures. Many of these credits exist to reward taxpayers for participating in aspects 
of the American Dream, and the check takes only moments to request. Praise, not stigma, 
comes along with its claiming.  
Essentially, the distribution of welfare in America boils down to a tale of two 
politics. Whereas the politics of direct spending currently places heavy burdens on the 
beneficiary, the politics of indirect spending rewards those who adequately engage with 
the cultural norm of hard work. One may think that this dichotomy is absent from the 
issue of child poverty; why subject some children to stigmatization? Unfortunately, it is 
very much present. At the turn of the century, the child tax credit succeeded Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children as the largest anti-child poverty policy in the nation. 




an indirect one, the CTC. This was the manifestation of decades’ worth of welfare 
debates.  
According to Melinda Cooper, families held a central role in this transition. 
Political actors on both sides often assail cash welfare programs for rewarding 
dependency. Social conservatives commonly argue that such programs erode the 
traditional household structure by providing benefits to unmarried and teenage mothers. 
Neoliberals, meanwhile, maintain that the “economic obligations of family should be 
enforced even when…bonds of kinship [have] broken down.”24 The intersection of 
conservative morality and liberal economics allows the convergence of two ideologically 
distinct groups of lawmakers. In the end, Cooper argues that neoliberals and social 
conservatives agree, “The private family (rather than the state) should serve as the 
primary source of economic security.”25 Under this mindset, a child tax credit is the 
natural response to child poverty. Families must ensure their fiscal wellbeing and the 
welfare state must reward them for doing so.  
Such an account offered by Cooper parallels this thesis. As the coming case 
studies will illustrate, the CTC has retained robust bipartisan support from social 
conservatives and moderate liberals throughout its entire legislative history. However, 
while Cooper places the family unit in the center of a neoliberal political economy, this 
thesis argues that neoliberal values themselves are the foundation of contemporary family 
policy. Several more scholars provide explanations as to why the United States 
                                                        
24 Cooper, Family Values, 68–69. 




distributes a partially refundable, and historically non-refundable, tax credit to families in 
response to child poverty. Joshua McCabe and Elizabeth Burman place the puzzle in a 
comparative context, asking why similar liberal welfare regimes were instead able to 
implement a fully refundable credit akin to a family allowance program. They argue that 
specific policy legacies from the 1940s that were present in nations like Canada were 
notably absent in the United States.26 Whereas Canadian policymakers perceived a 
refundable tax credit as in line with cultural values stemming from a modest family 
allowance system, American policymakers had no such legacies off which to base policy 
design.  
Path dependency is an undeniable influence in social policymaking. It is right to 
believe that, as McCabe and Burman argue, the United States is entrenched in indirect 
spending solutions to child poverty. However, it should not be forgotten that American 
policymakers have embraced traditional cash benefit programs in the past. President 
Richard Nixon, for example, personally advocated for a universal basic income program 
for families before falsely learning that such an initiative may increase divorce rates.27 
Although AFDC was far from a family allowance, the program shared similar ideals in 
that it gave direct relief to those in need. Nonetheless, it was abandoned almost entirely in 
favor of the child tax credit.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the contemporary literature on social welfare in 
America has established the advantages of indirect over direct spending initiatives. This 
                                                        
26 Joshua T. Mccabe and Elizabeth Popp Berman, “American Exceptionalism Revisited.” 




thesis intends to narrow the focus. Using the child tax credit as a lens into modern social 
policymaking, it demonstrates that neoliberal values are integral assets for political actors 
seeking to manipulate anti-poverty policy. Existing theories touch upon neoliberalism as 
an influence of policy design, but do not assert it as a causal mechanism. Through 
qualitative case studies and an original survey experiment, it will be clear that 
neoliberalism is to blame for counterintuitive solutions to child poverty. 
Methodology 
This thesis makes two contributions to the social welfare literature. First, it offers 
a new theoretical framework through which to interpret the neoliberal ideology. Instead 
of a collection of economic principles, neoliberalism is seen here as a political rationality 
that guides politicians through the policymaking process. A qualitative content analysis 
of the Congressional Record demonstrates that policymakers frequently divide target 
populations of indirect spending policies into deserving and undeserving groups. The 
mechanism for doing so is neoliberal rhetoric, which allows political actors to emphasize 
the relationship a beneficiary shares with the market. If such a relationship is deemed 
unproductive, then the beneficiary is deemed undeserving. 
 Second, this thesis offers a pragmatic argument. The child tax credit and other 
neoliberal indirect spending policies allow political actors to garner public support for 
regressive economic agendas. An original survey experiment demonstrates that 
legislation containing tax relief for the affluent experiences critical support if it also 
includes a social welfare oriented tax expenditure. Additionally, this survey aids the 




determining beneficiary worth. The findings and methodology pertaining to the survey 
experiment can be found in Chapter 3.  
Qualitative Content Analysis 
This thesis hypothesizes that Members of Congress (MOCs) divide target 
populations of social welfare policy by using neoliberal code words. If correct, Members 
will perceive beneficiaries of the CTC in terms of their economic worth and market 
relationships. Meanwhile, beneficiaries of AFDC/TANF will be perceived in terms of 
their social worth and racial demographics. Such characteristics will not be absent from 
the debates surrounding CTC reform; instead, this thesis predicts that they will be primed 
implicitly with neoliberal rhetoric. The availability of such rhetoric allows political actors 
to exclude beneficiaries from the CTC in a more acceptable manner. Rather than making 
explicit reference to the color of their skin or calling beneficiaries lazy, politicians can 
instead engage with cultural norms to describe some as hardworking and others as not. 
This primes the perceived deservingness of certain populations without revealing racial 
overtones, providing politicians with a means to divide people without large 
consequence. 
 It is nearly impossible, however, to recruit elected officials to participate in a 
social science study. This presents challenges to testing a hypothesis relating to how 
political actors view and characterize target populations of the child tax credit. Because 
they cannot be asked directly, their views are instead extrapolated from a qualitative 
content analysis of their own rhetoric. Specifically, remarks given on the House and 




by using an archival database of the Congressional Record. Additionally, press releases 
published by the offices of MOCs who were directly responsible for 2017 CTC reform 
were collected.  
Broad qualitative trends in rhetoric were synthesized, with particular attention to 
words identified by the vocabulary offered by Hall and colleagues as reflecting neoliberal 
values.28 There is a difference, for example, between passing policy for “families” and 
passing policy for “hardworking American families.” Whereas the former extends 
benefits to all, the latter conditions benefits on one’s relationship to the market. Although 
there is no formal eligibility requirement mentioned in the phrase “hardworking,” it is an 
implicit code word of deservingness. Such a word is directly reflective of neoliberal 
values, as the market productivity of a beneficiary is called into question. The triggering 
of neoliberal phrases is proven incredibly effective for politicians seeking to manipulate 
agendas and policy preferences in Chapter 3.   
Case Studies 
The content analysis performed by this thesis will be imbedded in a comparison 
of two historical case studies. The first case study provides a brief overview of 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), following its evolution from Aid to 
Dependent Children (ADC) to its current state of retrenchment. The second case study 
offers a lengthier, comprehensive review of the legislative history of the child tax credit. 
Three pieces of legislation will serve as focal points: the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, the 
                                                        




Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA, or the “Bush tax cuts”) 
of 2001 and the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017. The EGTRRA and the TCJA 
mark the largest expansions of the CTC since its creation in 1997. Additionally, an ample 
number of floor speeches regarding each act is readily available. Subsequently, the 
political context surrounding each piece of legislation can be revealed. 
 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families was a natural choice to compare 
against the child tax credit. While both are anti-child poverty policies, they embody two 
diametrically opposed approaches to the issue. Whereas TANF is a means-tested cash 
benefit, the CTC is a one-time annual payment delivered by the tax code. The CTC 
retains robust and bipartisan support, allowing it to grow without precedent into a more 
than trillion-dollar policy. Meanwhile, TANF retains sharp criticism from moderates and 
conservatives, allowing it to succumb to severe retrenchment at the hands of Democrats 
and Republicans alike.  
Beneficiaries of the two programs are also depicted in diverging manners. While 
recipients of TANF benefits are stigmatized as needy (the word is in the program’s title), 
those benefiting from the CTC are characterized as hardworking taxpayers. As such, the 
cultural norm of work can be attacked by opponents of TANF and reaffirmed by 
supporters of the CTC. Each of these opposing attributes allows significant insight as to 
why the politics of child poverty has shifted from direct to indirect spending solutions 




Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
Origins (1934-1960) 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is the manifestation of half-a-
century’s worth of welfare debates. What once delivered direct cash benefits to low-
income families with children on a continual basis is now a meager state-run program 
that provides temporary public assistance to families deemed “needy.” The program first 
emerges on the national stage in the midst of the Great Depression, when President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt signs into law the Social Security Act (SSA) of 1935. It 
begins as Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) and provides benefits to divorced and 
widowed mothers, as well as households with a disabled father. The evolution, and 
eventual devolution, of this program is well established in the literature surrounding 
American social policy. Before revealing the politics of indirect spending through the 
case of the child tax credit, this thesis briefly touches upon how neoliberal values impede 
the implementation of direct spending programs like ADC.  
 The story of ADC begins in 1934, during a time when President Roosevelt is 
facing unprecedented unemployment. He establishes the Committee on Economic 
Security, tasking it with the role of proposing government programs improving the 
wellbeing of citizens afflicted by the economic turmoil at hand. After only six months, 
the Committee produces a groundbreaking report providing the blue prints for several 
signature New Deal programs, including Aid to Dependent Children. It is based off 
“mothers’ pension programs” that have already existed since the turn of the century in 45 




federal government assume the role of these loosely connected programs by providing 
direct payments to single mothers. Such payments are framed not as benefits to able-
bodied adults, but rather as “defense measures” for children. Additionally, the Committee 
explains that payments are “designed to release from the wage-earning role the person 
whose natural function is to give her children the physical and affectionate guardianship 
necessary.”29 Under this plan, the federal government essentially becomes the primary 
wage earner for families with a widowed mother or disabled father so that childcare 
services in the household can be fulfilled.  
 As the nation progresses through the Great Depression and World War II, ADC is 
amended and made available to more people. The population makeup of beneficiaries 
changes significantly, with the program growing to serve many families where the father 
is alive but absent. In 1942, nearly 70% of ADC households have a father who is either 
deceased or disabled. That number drops to 44% by 1948, with nearly half of ADC 
households instead having an estranged father.30 This dynamic opens ADC to new 
criticism from both the left and the right, with opponents claiming that the program 
discourages marriage and employment. Additionally, the number of black families 
receiving ADC benefits increases by 46% over the same time.31 Taken together, 
opponents of the welfare state view the trends as indications of an opportune time to 
exploit racial attitudes and erode support for one of the largest anti-child poverty 
programs.  
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 Many of the guiding principles of the debate to come, however, can be identified 
in a founding document of the American welfare state itself. In the midst of the Great 
Depression, the Department of the Interior established the National Resources Planning 
Board (NRPB) to develop public work initiatives. The work of this committee was 
largely ignored at the time, but its ultimate report provides key insight into the dynamics 
behind the nation’s distribution of aid. The report encompasses three parts, each of which 
is dedicated to a specific dimension of the U.S. welfare state. Its third part serves to detail 
the institutionalization of U.S. social policy following World War II, offering 
recommendations on intergovernmental transfers, public-aid funds, and public-aid 
programs.32 Its final part, “Planning and the Future,” offers a road map for policymakers 
seeking to improve and expand social welfare policy. The guidance included by the 
NRPB in this penultimate section established the political landscape on which the CTC 
was created and ADC was destroyed five decades later.  
 The demise of ADC can be predicted from what the NRPB report both includes 
and lacks. Notably absent is a single reference to a universal social benefit; rather, each 
benefit is recommended as means-tested.33 The report urges policymakers to secure a 
“basic minimum security,” and claims that the well-being of people can only be directly 
improved through a better use of “productive resources, including labor.” Additionally, 
the NRPB argues, “social stability and values [are] threatened when people lack jobs.”34 
This statement holds true even for those with disabilities, as the report offers a detailed 
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section on “Work Programs for the Handicapped.”35 Subsequently, the report tethers the 
social welfare of individuals, including those who physically cannot work, to their 
relationship with the market. As the American welfare state transitions from a crisis 
response to an institution, neoliberal values embed themselves in its framework by 
reaffirming the cultural norm of hard work.  
Growth and Decline (1960-Present) 
Nonetheless, ADC continues to grow at rapid pace as the century progresses. It is 
made available to households with two parents for the first time in 1961, with men being 
required to take part in job training programs. Given this expansion in target populations, 
the program is renamed as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). The 
number of beneficiaries more than triples in less than a decade, increasing from less than 
one-million in 1964 to over three million in 1973.36 All of this, however, is fodder for its 
opponents. “What began on a small scale in the Depression of the [1930’s] has become a 
huge monster in the prosperous [1960’s],” warns President Nixon.37 Throughout the 
1980s, the Reagan Administration lobbies forcefully for AFDC control to be devolved to 
state governments. The debate that emerges centers on whether it is acceptable for the 
government to give a check to people who do not work.  
President Reagan and conservative actors shift the debate to include neoliberal 
tropes that are common features in U.S. social policymaking today. Aid is no longer 
conditioned on being a citizen in need; instead, it is given only to responsible neoliberal 
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subjects who are deemed worthy. Beneficiaries of means-tested welfare programs, once 
sympathetic mothers and children, are now framed as “welfare queens” and 
“dependents.” The racial dynamics at play are obvious and result in powerful effects on 
redistribution preferences among the public.  
Martin Gilens, for example, runs a content analysis of 40 years’ worth of news 
coverage on poverty between 1950 and 1992. Prior to the 1960s, most news stories on 
poverty were sympathetic and accompanied by images of the white rural poor. Towards 
the end of the century, however, the images of poverty consisted mainly of black 
Americans. Despite virtually no change in African-American poverty rates, African 
Americans went from being featured in 27% of poverty stories in 1964 to 72% in 1967.38 
Moreover, the stories became less sympathetic and placed more responsibility on the 
individual. By the time President Reagan assumes office, poverty in America has already 
become racialized.  
As such, Americans increasingly base their social welfare policy preferences on 
racial misconceptions. Such a dynamic proves detrimental to gaining consensus on direct 
spending solutions to child poverty. Political actors on both sides in the 1980s and 1990s 
rely on neoliberal language to exploit this. President Bill Clinton runs his election 
campaign on a promise to “end welfare as we know it,” while Congressional Republicans 
offer an entire reorientation of American welfare through the Contract with America. 
“Government programs designed to give a helping hand to the neediest of Americans 
have instead bred illegitimacy, crime, illiteracy, and more poverty,” writes Congressman 
                                                        




Newt Gingrich (R-GA).39 Americans receiving social welfare benefits are identified as 
the “neediest” among us, and they are chastised for allegedly rejecting a productive 
market relationship in exchange for a government handout. This rhetoric takes hold 
across the country.  
The arguments put forth by the Contract with America redefine AFDC as an 
immoral program that operates at the cost of hardworking taxpayers. Congressman 
Gingrich criticizes AFDC for “making welfare more attractive than work,” despite the 
fact that most recipients are indeed in the labor force.40 The authors of the Contract offer 
a stark characterization of AFDC payments that would rally social conservatives across 
the country: “The federal government provides young girls the following deal: Have an 
illegitimate baby and taxpayers will guarantee you cash, food stamps, and medical care, 
plus a host of other benefits. As long as you stay single and don’t work, we’ll continue 
giving you benefits.”41 This rhetoric paints a picture far from the original framing of 
ADC, which heralded the program as an improvement in the lives of impoverished 
children. Now, children born into households that do not reflect traditional family 
structure or proper market relationships are characterized as illegitimate and undeserving 
of aid.  
This language went on to gain traction at the state and local levels of government. 
New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani is quoted in the New York Times as having 
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called the welfare system a “perverted social philosophy.”42 Through these comments, it 
is clear that recipients of direct spending programs are explicitly characterized by their 
social characteristics. Beneficiaries are cast as needy, lazy, illegitimate, and perverted. 
This language emboldens states to redefine the scope of social programs, choosing to 
emphasize employment over education and training.  
Eventually, state governments receive the means to innovate new approaches to 
welfare. President Clinton signs into law the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in August of 1996, ending AFDC and 
transforming it into Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. The program is devolved, 
with TANF block grants being distributed to states that would then deliver benefits to 
populations as they see fit. Significant restrictions on aid are set into place by PRWORA. 
Most notably, it limits the amount of public assistance a beneficiary can receive. Families 
can receive TANF benefits for no more than two years at a time and no more than five 
years in a lifetime.  
With state governments in control, however, benefits vary by region. Some states 
go so far as to abolish cash aid, instead investing their block grants into work programs 
and private contractors who place TANF recipients into jobs. The New York Times 
describes the transition as, “A system evolving from a national safety net into a series of 
state trampolines.”43 The core principles guiding the initial ADC program are no longer 
identifiable. The statutory purpose changes from “ensuring the care of children” to 
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“provid[ing] assistance to needy families, end[ing] dependence of needy parents on 
government benefits, reduc[ing] out-of-wedlock pregnancies, and promot[ing] the 
formation and maintenance of two-parent families.”44 The stated goal of this new 
neoliberal mindset is to push children off direct spending programs and into traditional 
households with healthy market relationships.  
It goes without saying that the impact these changes had on real people was 
enormous. “Hardship is not the word for it,” explains Theresa Sledge, a 22-year-old 
mother of three children who had her benefits terminated.45 However, the neoliberal 
mindset asserts that Sledge’s removal from the program is a success. By denying aid to 
hundreds of thousands of children, the federal government was able to significantly 
decrease social spending and later enjoy a budget surplus. Personal sacrifices were made 
for the good of the national economy. Many contemporary scholars have identified racial 
dynamics as the causal mechanism behind AFDC’s demise. The importance of race in the 
narrative of this program cannot be overstated; however, neoliberal rhetoric also plays a 
key role. Political actors could not explicitly condition aid on the racial makeup of 
beneficiaries without fear of electoral, and legal, retribution. Instead, they found a new 
manner of separating target populations.  
By calling to attention whether one is productively aligned with the market, 
politicians are able to draw attention to the cultural norm of hard work in the American 
psyche. The few who break this norm – who do not work, often for a variety of legitimate 
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reasons – do not deserve the benefits that come from those who adhere to the norm – 
hardworking taxpayers. The use of neoliberal code words allows political actors to deem 
certain target populations as unworthy and thus garner support for shifting the manner in 
which social programs are run. As shown through the case of TANF, this dynamic occurs 
to the detriment of direct spending programs. Within the politics of indirect spending, 
however, neoliberal mechanisms can strengthen the formation of an entirely new 
conception of social welfare policy. This is best illustrated through the child tax credit, an 
anti-child poverty policy that eclipses the presence of TANF by all accounts and 
measurements. 
The Child Tax Credit 
Origins (1987-1997) 
On a September afternoon in 1994, Congressman Newt Gingrich (R-GA) stands 
upon the steps leading into the Capitol Building. Over 300 Republican candidates for the 
United States House of Representatives line up, united, behind him. Gingrich, soon to 
become Speaker of the House, proudly proclaims a policy platform that will place his 
party into the majority in Congress and state legislatures across the country. “We’re here 
because we are taking the first steps, and we are taking them in a Contract with the 
American people,” announces Gingrich. He then unveils the Contract with America, an 
agenda outlining Republican approaches to welfare, crime, and governance for the 
decade to come. As the nation watches on television and reads in print, each candidate 




 This is the first instance of mainstream political actors seriously considering the 
child tax credit. Shortly after taking the majority, House Republicans introduced the 
American Dream Restoration Act. Marketed as tax relief for the middle-class, the crux of 
this act codifies a key proposal of the Contract with America. “To help families reach 
their American Dream, our Contract calls for $500-per-child tax credit, to make raising 
children a little more affordable,” writes Gingrich.46 While the American Dream 
Restoration Act never passed, it brought the CTC into the national conversation 
forevermore. The policy would come to attract support from both sides of the political 
aisle and engrain itself into the American budget. Although this is the start of the CTC’s 
journey through the halls of Congress, its original conception actually begins with the 
George H. W. Bush Administration. 
 As the two parties battled for the label of “pro-family” throughout the late 
twentieth century, Democratic lawmakers would routinely offer childcare proposals for 
households with two working parents. Alternatively, Republicans appealed to families 
reflecting traditional household structures. Families with one working parent and one 
stay-at-home parent were a key voting block for the Republican Party, and President 
George H. W. Bush proposed a policy that would recognize the childcare efforts of this 
constituency. The Young Child Tax Credit (YCTC), initially available to families with 
children younger than four years old, would help with the costs of child rearing 
regardless of whether childcare services were paid for by a household. It was passed in 
                                                        




1990 in an effort to compromise with Democrats on a childcare package that included 
direct spending measures and tax expenditures.  
Ultimately, the YCTC was made available only for families with children younger 
than one year old. Its inclusion in the final omnibus bill was deemed non-negotiable by 
the White House Chief of Staff, signaling that this policy was meant to be a testament to 
the Republican’s commitment of providing tax relief for families.47 Although this credit 
does not reflect the current-day form of the CTC, it reveals the dynamics that would 
guide the policy to come. Several serious direct spending proposals were introduced by 
political actors at the time, including paid family leave and childcare grants. Instead, a tax 
credit was enacted. This credit did not provide relief for families in so much as it 
incentivized specific behavior by rewarding households with young children and stay-at-
home mothers. While the Democrats touted large social programs for working families, 
Republicans pushed for indirect social spending that would reward traditional values in 
the household.  
The YCTC, however, did not last long. It was soon nixed by the Clinton 
Administration, which viewed the credit as confusing and too specific. President Clinton 
instead wanted to pursue spending proposals that would provide tax relief for families as 
well as lift children out of poverty, and he obtained a roadmap for doing so from the 
legacy of his predecessor. In December of 1987, the National Commission on Children 
was established by Congress and President Bush to define the underlying issues of child 
poverty and recommend remedies for them. The Commission, chaired by Senator John D. 
                                                        




Rockefeller IV (D-WV), consisted of 32 members from diverse backgrounds. Teachers, 
healthcare professionals, elected representatives, and leaders of interest groups and 
advocacy organizations served the Commission with their own unique perspectives of 
child poverty. The final report, Beyond Rhetoric: A New American Agenda for Children 
and Families, was approved unanimously in 1991 and intended to guide the policy 
debates of the coming decade. 
It is within this report where the child tax credit in its intended form can be found. 
The Commission offers a bold income security plan that, if enacted in its entirety, would 
have reduced AFDC dependency by 42% at the time.48 The first element of its income 
security plan is a fully refundable $1000-per-child tax credit. Even if parents do not owe 
taxes, they will receive the full value of the credit in the form of a cash benefit. At first 
glance, the Commission’s report may seem like a precursor to the Contract with America. 
In fact, they share similar intentions. The income security plan was “based on 
fundamental American principles of work, family, and independence” and sought to 
“increase incentives for low-income families to become economically self-sufficient.”49 
Like the Contract with America, the Beyond Rhetoric report boasts a reorientation of 
American welfare based on the cultural norm of work. However, a deeper look reveals a 
divergence between the two approaches.  
Whereas the Contract intends to reduce AFDC dependency simply by slashing 
social spending, Beyond Rhetoric proposes a systematic alleviation of poverty to make 
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traditional means-tested cash payments less relevant. The Commission dedicates a 
significant portion of its report to an overview of child allowance programs in Western 
European nations, explicitly noting the exceptionalism of the United States in this 
regard.50 It is clear that the Commission intends the CTC to reflect a universal child 
allowance program, as it argues that the bridging of middle- and lower-income earners 
would create a powerful linkage between families and the economic mainstream.  
Additionally, unlike the Contract, Beyond Rhetoric describes the child tax credit 
as serving more uses than tax relief. The CTC, although operating through the tax code, 
was an anti-child poverty policy by design. Commission members write that the credit 
provides “income security to poor, single-parent families” and lifts children out of 
poverty, regardless of the amount of taxes a family pays.51 There exists no requirements 
other than having a dependent child to benefit from the CTC. The credit benefits “hard-
pressed single and married parents” while also ensuring not to “discourage the formation 
of two-parent families or of single-earner families in which one parent chooses to stay at 
home and care for the children.”52 This dichotomy ensures that the original role of the 
YCTC, which was to encourage traditional family structure, would not be lost through a 
CTC that is fully refundable.  
Importantly, this recommendation was not considered disposable by the 
Commission. Accounting for $40 billion of the estimated $52 billion in new funding 
needed to implement the Commission’s agenda, the CTC was the primary method though 
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which the body addressed child poverty. Moreover, broad consensus existed on the CTC 
from members of the Commission. Despite a 32-0 approval vote, the report received 
backlash from members relating to specific items. However, not a single member 
signaled disapproval of the CTC. In fact, it was brought up only when referring to the 
common ground that compelled approval of the final recommendations. Marian Wright 
Edelman, founder of the left-leaning Children’s Defense Fund (CDF), writes to Senator 
Rockefeller about concerns for the final report but notes, “I am particularly pleased with 
our recommendations for a universal and refundable child tax credit.”53 Similarly, Allan 
Carlson, then President of the Rockford Institute, a conservative think tank, expresses 
significant reservations on the final recommendations. Nonetheless, he makes sure to 
praise the CTC as “an important affirmation of children.”54 Even when discussing their 
differences, two political actors on opposing ends of the ideological spectrum make an 
effort to recognize their appreciation for the CTC. 
However, this may be due to their different conceptions of the CTC. Tax 
expenditures gain much of their political capital from their ambiguity, and this is nicely 
illustrated through the letters from Wright and Carlson. Whereas Wright describes it as a 
“step towards a child insurance system,” Carlson refers to it as a “real tax cut.”55 These 
two descriptions are diametrically opposed: a universal allowance program versus a tax 
cut. Still, they both accurately label the same policy. This flexibility in framing will prove 
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incredibly powerful throughout the codification and evolution of the CTC, allowing it to 
serve different constituencies for different purposes.  
Ironically, the child tax credit currently creates consequences that are 
fundamentally opposed to those of its original design in Beyond Rhetoric. The benefit 
initially was to be given to Americans by virtue of being a parent. Today, the benefit is 
given not by virtue of being a parent but instead by being a responsible neoliberal worker. 
The $500-per-child credit proposed by House Republicans in the Contract with America 
was ultimately signed into law through the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, a bill that 
attracted intense debate and scrutiny relating to whether a CTC would constitute welfare 
or tax relief. A qualitative content analysis of the rhetoric used by mainstream political 
actors reveals that underlying neoliberal dynamics proved influential in the ultimate 
design of the credit. 
 Implementation (1997-2001) 
Recall that Congressional Republicans staked not only their pride on 
implementing the Contract with America, but also their careers. The makeup of the 105th 
Congress provided potential for their ability to deliver, with both the Senate and House 
under Republican control. Additionally, having promised to “end welfare as we know it,” 
the Clinton Administration proved open to work with many proposals the Contract 
offered. A key item on which the Administration and Congress converged was the child 
tax credit. Although both President Clinton and Speaker Gingrich wanted to pass a CTC, 
their reasons for doing so were different. Whereas Clinton wanted to provide relief to 




otherwise regressive bill. This divergence guided the debate surrounding the Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 1997. 
On June 24, 1997, the Taxpayer Relief Act is introduced to the House. Because 
the very first title of the bill is dedicated to the child tax credit, it is evident that House 
Republicans wish to put family policy at the forefront of the legislation.56 In actuality, the 
bill delivers a regressive economic agenda that provides a disproportionate amount of tax 
relief and incentives to wealthy Americans. Nevertheless, debate on the House and 
Senate floors instead focuses on the vitality of the child tax credit. Congressional 
Democrats attempt to weave a narrative of upward redistribution into their critiques of 
the proposed credit, while Republicans attempt to paint them as ignorant to the needs of 
families.  
Three main points of contention arose regarding the passage of the child tax 
credit. First, liberal lawmakers wanted to make the credit partially refundable, allowing 
families with no earned income to benefit. Second, Congressional Democrats and the 
Clinton Administration fought for taxpayers to file their CTC ahead of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), a popular tax expenditure for low-income earners who work. 
The Republican proposal called for the CTC to be applied after the EITC. This would 
have prevented the CTC from reaching most low-income earners, as the EITC would 
remove a substantial amount of their tax liabilities upfront. Third, Republican lawmakers 
wished to prevent the CTC from being applicable to payroll taxes, again creating a 
significant obstacle to the inclusion of lower-income earners. 
                                                        




All three issues are discussed at length on the House and Senate floors. Liberal 
Members of Congress (MOCs) are quick to criticize the bill for falling short of relief for 
low-income families. Congresswoman Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) frames it as, “If we are Bill 
Gates we are going to get a tax credit, but a police officer who is making $23,000…is 
going to be denied a child tax credit.”57 Republicans, however, are just as quick to 
dismiss these claims. “Again, here we go with the baloney,” says Congressman Gerald 
Solomon (R-NY).58 Conservative actors consistently counter in their remarks that the 
CTC is only for “hardworking American families” who pay their fair share in taxes. 
Payroll taxes, they add, are not analogous to income tax because workers are simply 
paying into benefits they later will receive, such as Social Security and Medicare. 
Congressman John Thune (R-SD), now a U.S. Senator, sums up the Republican argument 
in saying, “The difference we are drawing here is that we want to bring tax relief to 
people who are paying taxes, and they want to increase payments, welfare payments, to 
people who are not.”59 Subsequently, the optics cast Democrats as pursuing a direct 
spending program and Republicans as pursuing tax relief for hardworking families.  
This argument gains traction on the House floor. Each Republican rebuttal 
following Congressman Thune’s remarks casts Democrats as favoring welfare spending. 
Congressman Charlie Norwood (R-GA), for example, charges that liberal lawmakers hide 
their true motivations for a partially refundable CTC. “What we are trying to do is return 
some of the hard-earned money that working people in this country earn,” he begins. The 
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Congressman continues, “If Members want other children and other families who are not 
paying taxes to have a $500 per child tax credit, say so, but be honest about it. Call it 
what it is. It is a welfare program.”60 For anyone tuning into this debate, the contrast 
between Republicans and Democrats appears clear. Republicans rely upon neoliberal 
code words, such as “hard-earned money,” to signal that they are supporting this benefit 
only for those deemed deserving of it. This particular Congressman goes so far as to label 
families and children who are not productively aligned with the market as “other.” 
Democrats, meanwhile, appear comfortable in funneling benefits through a traditional 
welfare program that aids Americans who allegedly do not pay taxes and, subsequently, 
do not deserve assistance.  
However, this depiction of the Democrats is pushed in bad faith. Even Democrats 
at the time did not wish to allow many low-income earners to benefit from the CTC. 
Congressman Charles Rangel (D-NY), a looming figure in Democratic politics, explains, 
“The President said he wanted working families, not welfare families, to get a tax break 
for their kids.”61 Moreover, Rangel insists that Democrats are simply trying to ensure that 
“working, proud people who do not want welfare” are able to receive the CTC.62 Several 
members of the caucus agree. Congressman Tom Allen (D-ME) confirms, “This is not 
about protecting the poor. It is not. It is about protecting hard-working middle-income 
Americans and making sure that they get the benefit.”63 This is a drastic reversal from the 
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original design of the child tax credit offered by the National Commission on Children. 
Its explicit goal of reducing child poverty has now been altered by conservative 
Republican and moderate Democratic legislators operating in tandem. Rather than lifting 
children out of poverty, the child tax credit is spun as another tax break for middle- and 
upper-class parents who work hard for proud-earned money. 
By avoiding a direct spending approach to child poverty, Republicans were able 
to utilize the politics of indirect spending to their advantage. Conservative political actors 
routinely called attention to the optics of Democratic opposition. “The Republican plan 
covers 11 million more children than the President’s plan,” states Congressman John 
Linder (R-GA). The Congressman essentially uses children as bargaining chips, leaving 
the Democrats to fall victim to an anti-family policy narrative. As the findings of an 
original survey experiment demonstrate in Chapter 3, this tactic proves incredibly 
effective in manipulating public support for regressive economic policy such as the 
Taxpayer Relief Act. Congressman John Kasich (R-OH), the sponsor of the bill, 
explicitly frames the legislation as being “all about putting power in the pockets of 
America’s families.”64 It is politically tough to be against such an endeavor. Democrats 
were left to only mitigate child poverty, not solve it. Twenty-seven Democrats voted for 
the bill to move forward to the Senate, and the Congressional Record shows that every 
single Democrat who spoke on the floor prior to voting “Yea” used the child tax credit as 
their justification. The common argument of a perfect bill being the enemy of a good 
deed prevailed.  
                                                        




Similar dynamics are at play during the debate on the Senate floor. Senator Tom 
Daschle (D-SD), serving as Minority Leader, offers an amendment that would make the 
CTC partially refundable against payroll taxes, as well as stack the CTC ahead of the 
EITC. Additionally, he submits a letter to the record indicating support for the 
amendment from the U.S. Treasury Department.65 Several Democratic Senators, 
including John Kerry of Massachusetts and Mary Landrieu of Louisiana, offer similar 
amendments. Senator Don Nickles (R-OK) serves as the main debater on the Republican 
side. His scrutiny of each amendment hinges on one principle: money should not be 
redistributed from those who work hard to those who do not.66 In fact, he goes so far as to 
argue that upper-income earners should be receiving more than the present bill provides, 
claiming that upper-income families who deserve the child tax credit are not getting it.67 
Additionally, Senator Nickles believes that making the credit available against payroll 
taxes would raise spending. It is interesting to note that his concern of spending is not 
present when arguing that upper-income families should benefit; the price tag enters the 
conversation only when MOCs discuss extending benefits to low-income earners. None 
of the Democratic amendments relating to the child tax credit gains more than 40 votes, 
far short of the 60 needed for approval. 
Surprisingly, each amendment receives sizeable opposition from the Democratic 
caucus. Moderate Democrats, such as Senators Max Baucus (D-MT) and John Breaux 
(D-LA), rise in opposition to the amendments and raise the familiar argument of 
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perfectionist attitudes blocking much needed family relief.68 Once again, the child tax 
credit is facilitated by a broad coalition of conservative and moderate lawmakers. The 
Taxpayer Relief Act goes on to pass the Senate by an 80 to 18 vote. Similar to House 
Democrats, nearly every Senate Democrat uses the child tax credit as a justification for 
their Yea vote.69 A few liberal senators, such as Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), vote Nay due 
to the inequities present in the CTC. “Because the credit is nonrefundable, many middle- 
and low-income Americans will be unable to take advantage of the child tax credit,” 
explains Senator Reed.70 Despite such opposition from liberals, moderate and 
conservative political actors formed a winning alliance.  
Ultimately, liberal lawmakers were appeased at the conference phase. This step in 
the legislative process reconciles the bills passed by the House and the Senate into one 
bill, which is then voted on for a final time by both chambers. The conference establishes 
the CTC as a $500-per-child nonrefundable credit to be stacked in front of the EITC, a 
massive victory for Congressional Democrats and the Clinton Administration. 
Additionally, the credit phases out starting at $110,000 for joint filers and $75,000 for 
single filers and is partially refundable for families with three or more dependent 
children.71 These changes create a watershed of support for the final bill, which passes 
the House by a vote of 393-43 and the Senate by a vote of 92-8. Once again, nearly every 
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single Democrat who flips their vote to Yea on the final passage cites the child tax credit 
as a driving factor for doing so.  
Moderate and conservative lawmakers, as well as several liberal lawmakers, tout 
the bill as a testament to hardworking American families. In explaining why she intends 
to flip her vote, Congresswoman Karen Thurman (D-FL) says, “Hardworking middle 
class families will enjoy the benefit of the child tax credit.”72 Each actor, whether on the 
left or on the right, ensures to emphasize the relationship between a CTC beneficiary and 
the market. The beneficiaries that the Democrats fought to include were those who “work 
hard, they contribute to our economy and our communities, and they deserve our help.”73 
Senator Landrieu, who attempted to amend the CTC due to its inequities, now says, 
“Democrats supported the expansion of this $500 child tax credit to hard-working, not 
welfare but hard-working middle-class and moderate-income families.”74 Senators 
Barbara Mikulski (D-MD) and Jon Kyl (R-AZ) agree that, “We are talking here about 
letting hard-working, tax-paying families keep more of what they earn.”75 This narrative 
of letting hardworking American families “keep more of what they earn” will follow the 
CTC to present day instances of reform, serving to reassure Republican constituencies 
that this is not a traditional welfare program.  
Nonetheless, some Congressional Democrats went so far as to seek credit for the 
revised bill. Senator Kerry, who initially voted Nay, now claims, “This is the 
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embodiment of the Democratic principles I mentioned earlier. This victory for America’s 
children and middle-income families is a victory for America itself.”76 A sharp reversal 
from someone who was once the lead critic of the Taxpayer Relief Act. “Democrats 
fought to get [hardworking families] in, we prevailed, and we should be proud of that,” 
says Congressman John Spratt (D-SC) in what sounds like a victory lap for the party. In 
the end, Democrats spin the bill as a victory for Americans who deserve assistance. 
Senator Carol Moseley Braun (D-IL) believes that the final child tax credit serves to 
benefit those who are “working hard and [are] paying taxes.” She ends by saying, “They 
deserve this tax relief.”77  
Taken together, the remarks on the House and Senate floors reaffirm the distinct 
grouping of target populations. Unlike the positive classification of families offered by 
Schneider and Ingram (1993), political actors sharply divide children by their economic 
worth. Those who have parents who work hard, who do not live in “welfare families,” 
deserve help and receive it. Those with parents who do not work hard are classified as 
deviants and thus are undeserving. One may argue that the term “hard work” is vague and 
difficult to measure. In the politics of indirect spending, however, it is straightforward. 
Work and productivity are measured by a beneficiary’s relationship to the market, and 
their tax liability is taken as a proxy. Those with large tax liabilities are assumed to have 
large incomes and subsequently perceived as hardworking. Those with small liabilities 
must not take home much pay and therefore must not work hard. The neoliberal mindset 
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views contributions not in terms of their societal worth, but instead in terms of their 
economic worth. As such, low-income single parents are not seen as hardworking and are 
often characterized as lazy, despite juggling several commitments to work and childcare. 
Instead of offering an entrance into the economic mainstream, the welfare state excludes 
these parents from much needed benefits.  
There is a much more cynical dynamic at play, however, with regard to the child 
tax credit and the politics of indirect spending. Often during the debate, conservative 
actors used the child tax credit as a bargaining chip. This strategy paid off. The child tax 
credit allowed a coalition of moderate and conservative legislators to guarantee the 
passage of the Taxpayer Relief Act, a largely regressive piece of economic legislation. 
While it lost the support of a few liberal lawmakers, it gained crucial support from 
moderate Democrats. Congressman David Bonior (D-MI), the House Democratic Whip, 
summarizes this dynamic in saying, “I must tell my colleagues this afternoon and 
concede that we have paid a price for all of this…In exchange for extending the child 
credit for working families, Republicans demanded huge tax breaks for the wealthiest 5 
percent, and they got them.”78 As the CTC continues its legislative journey, the dynamics 
revealed by Congressman Bonior will become a longstanding feature of its reform. Each 
point of evolution occurs alongside a regressive economic agenda. This is not 
coincidental.  
                                                        





At the turn of the century, the CTC grew to reflect the identifying characteristics 
of an anti-poverty policy. The CTC was left largely untouched until 2001, existing only 
as a tax break predominately for middle-class families. This changed under the Bush 
Administration. With the House of Representatives and White House under Republican 
control and the Senate evenly split, President Bush had a degree of flexibility in 
determining how to use the budget surplus left by his predecessor. It was decided in the 
107th Congress that the surplus was to be used to provide tax relief for Americans; 
however, a familiar tune of inequity quickly arose. As Congressional Republicans pushed 
cuts to corporate rates, moderates and conservatives alike sought to use the timing as an 
opportunity to strengthen and expand the CTC. 
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of 2001, 
often referred to as the first of the two “Bush tax cuts,” is debated on the Senate floor on 
May 23, 2001. A central dynamic of the debate emerges from the child tax credit, as the 
bill intends to double it from $500- to $1000-per child. The proposed changes to the CTC 
receive harsh criticism from Democrats, as they believe the credit fails to reach those 
would need it the most. Hoping to quell this discontent and make the bill palatable to the 
Democratic caucus, Senator Olympia Snowe (R-ME), a moderate voice in the body, 
offers an amendment.   
Mainly, liberal lawmakers are displeased that the credit would remain 
nonrefundable and thus unavailable to low-income earners under the bill. Senator Snowe 




refundability formula. S.Amdt.741 would make the $1000 credit partially refundable to 
those earning more than $10,000. For every dollar above the income threshold, parents 
would receive fifteen-cents in refundable credits. “My provision…gives these kids the 
hope of a childhood without poverty,” says Senator Snowe.79 The role of the child tax 
credit shifts from tax relief, as intended in the Contract with America, to reducing child 
poverty, as intended in the Beyond Rhetoric report.   
 Nonetheless, there are a number of children living in poverty whose parents do 
not earn more than $10,000. Additionally, many parents simply do not file taxes if they 
earn less than the standard deduction. If it were the true intention of political actors to end 
child poverty, then a systematic approach to the issue would have been sought. Instead, 
MOCs attempt to address the issue through an indirect spending program that makes a 
regressive bill appear more reasonable. “No package could truly be said to produce 
fairness without including a refundable child tax credit,” claims Senator Snowe.80 The 
inclusion of CTC reform allows conservative MOCs to spin the bill as family policy that 
reduces child poverty, as well as make the bill easier for moderate Democrats to swallow. 
Once again, neoliberal rhetoric appears to facilitate this dynamic. According to Senator 
Snowe, the refundability amendment “sends an important message of encouragement that 
we want those who work hard and strive to improve their lives to succeed.”81 Those who 
do not work hard – in this case, those with incomes below $10,000 – do not deserve a 
helping hand in child rearing.  
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 Members on both sides are aware of the shortcomings of such an approach. Even 
Senator Snowe herself acknowledges, “Will this tax relief solve all the financial problems 
faced by eligible families? No.”82 Senator Rockefeller (D-WV), who chaired the 
commission that originally proposed a fully refundable CTC, calls the amendment only a 
“step in the right direction.”83 These admissions do not prevent the amendment from 
passing in an overwhelming 94-4 vote when the debate concludes. Every Democratic 
Senator votes Yea, taking the air out of their argument for foul play. Republican Senators 
immediately charge that the bill constitutes tax relief for all families, even those who do 
not pay taxes. “For people who don’t even pay taxes today but have families and have 
issues with raising their children, they are going to receive a direct payment,” says 
Senator Judd Gregg (R-NH) in response to calls of inequities.84 The refundability 
amendment was the turning point in the passage of EGTRRA, allowing moderate and 
conservative political actors to spin the bill as an attack on child poverty. 
 Such a framing of the bill was true, to an extent. The CTC would now be 
available in higher amounts to minimum wage earners, who were originally excluded 
entirely from the benefit by the Taxpayer Relief Act. Children were lifted out of poverty 
and the credit lessened poverty overall for a great number of families. However, these 
improvements must be reconciled with the complete bill at hand. The doubling of the 
CTC was set to roll out gradually over ten years, with the maximum credit reaching 
$1,000 in 2010. Additionally, the refundability percentage would not reach 15% until 
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2005. Each of these changes were not made permanent and were set to expire by the turn 
of the decade. Meanwhile, cuts for corporations and the affluent were immediate and 
permanent. Analysis from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) finds that 
the top 1% of households each received an average tax cut of $570,000 from 2004 to 
2012, totaling an average of $50,000-per-year in savings.85 Relative to this, the CTC 
reform amounted to pocket change for struggling families.  
 The Bush tax cuts changed the dynamics of the child tax credit profoundly and 
guided the evolution of the benefit over the next two decades. Following the EGTRRA, 
the CTC became the largest anti-child poverty policy in the country. Moreover, the 
EGTRRA proved to political actors that indirect social spending could be a powerful tool 
in manipulating legislative agendas. This method of distribution allowed conservative 
members to push regressive economic and anti-child poverty legislation at the same time, 
bridging coalitions of moderate Democrats and Republicans at each step of the legislative 
process. The CTC was left largely untouched until 2017, with the notable exception of 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. This act lowers the refundability 
threshold from $10,000 to $3,000 in an effort to stimulate the economy during a time of 
recession.86 This change, as well as the original increase from $500 to $1,000 made by 
the EGTRRA, is eventually made permanent.  
 Until Republicans return to power under the Trump Presidency, the child tax 
credit is largely left alone by lawmakers. Enjoying comfortable majorities in both the 
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House and the Senate, the Republican Party turns the page to tax reform following the 
2016 Election. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 consumed much of the 
proceedings of the 115th Congress, proposing over $1.5 trillion dollars in historic tax cuts. 
The crux of this bill is the slashing of the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%, argued by 
Republican MOCs to spur record growth in the economy and create thousands of jobs. 
However, upon hitting the House floor, Democratic MOCs immediately attack the bill for 
the unequal benefits it bestows on high-income earners. Realizing the consequences of 
such a narrative, two Republican Senators attempt to change the optics by using the 
TCJA as an opportunity to expand the child tax credit. 
 Senators Marco Rubio (R-FL) and Mike Lee (R-UT) take to the Senate floor to 
issue a warning to Republican leadership. “Right now, 70 percent of the tax cuts we’re 
considering would go to businesses, and only 30 percent to individuals,” they explain in 
an issued statement.87 The two Senators then offer an amendment that would double the 
CTC to $2,000-per-child and decrease the proposed cut in the corporate rate from 20% to 
20.94% to offset the costs. If CTC reform were not pursued in an effort to make the bill 
appear fairer, Senators Rubio and Lee promised to vote Nay on the final passage. This 
maneuver essentially holds the bill hostage in the Senate, as Majority Leader Mitch 
McConnell (R-KY) can only afford to lose one Senator from his caucus. For the third 
time in its journey through Congress, the child tax credit is placed in the center of debate 
surrounding a piece of regressive economic legislation.  
                                                        




 The tropes present during the debates of the Taxpayer Relief Act and the Bush tax 
cuts show themselves again, with MOCs relying heavily on neoliberal rhetoric to push 
the TCJA through. “Every honest person sees this as a tax cut for hardworking 
Americans,” says Congressman Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) on the House floor.88 When 
Senator Bob Casey, Jr. (D-PA) challenges the fairness of an expanded CTC that is not 
fully refundable, the companion Senator from his state pushes back. “So let’s see: more 
money in child tax credit, less taxes owed on the part of families, more job opportunities, 
and higher wages. I think it is a pretty safe bet that this is good for kids,” says Senator Pat 
Toomey (R-PA).89 Conservative political actors such as Senator Toomey are able to spin 
the CTC as an indication of the bill’s wide scope. Essentially, the narrative of the bill 
shifts from one of inequity to one of child poverty. This bill, conservative and moderate 
actors can genuinely argue, lifts children out of poverty and a vote against it is a vote 
against vulnerable kids.  
 This is far from the narrative that Democrats wish to pursue, which is one of tax 
cuts for the rich at the cost of the poor. Nonetheless, Democratic MOCs find themselves 
on a neoliberal political landscape. The neoliberal mindset is perhaps best illustrated 
through Senators Rubio and Lee’s attempt to address child poverty through a tax relief 
bill. Throughout their campaign for votes on their amendment, the Senators unleashed a 
plethora of press releases, interviews, op-eds, and floor statements labelling their 
approach as “pro-growth and pro-worker tax reform.”90 No longer are political actors 
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able to pass direct spending programs that solely address social crises such as child 
poverty. Instead, they work through the market. “Understand that this is not a welfare 
check,” assures Senator Rubio when explaining the amendment on Fox News. “What 
we’re talking about is allowing them to keep more of their own money, you only get it if 
you’re working,” says Senator Rubio.91 The CTC in Rubio’s perspective is reserved only 
for poor children who deserve it. 
Neoliberal values facilitate the passage of economic agendas, but they also 
constrain ways in which we judge policy as successful. Lifting children out of poverty is 
successful if and only if it is “pro-growth.” If it leads to any short-term suspension of 
economic prosperity, it is deemed unattainable. If it goes to anyone with an unproductive 
market relationship, it is deemed dangerous. The neoliberal mindset challenges our 
conception of good politics by tethering our assessment measures to market and 
economic proxies. We judge the CTC not by how many children it lifts out of poverty, 
but by whether it is revenue neutral and contributing to growth. One could argue that this 
is a cynical perspective. It may be that Senators Rubio and Lee truly want to lift children 
out of poverty and are working with the best options available. Further inspection of the 
Congressional Record demonstrates that this is not the case.  
The Rubio-Lee amendment was not the only amendment offered relevant to the 
child tax credit. Indeed, Senators Sherrod Brown (D-OH) and Michael Bennet (D-CO) 
initially worked on the amendment with Rubio and Lee. They chose to separate, however, 
when Rubio and Lee would not adjust the CTC to inflation. “We can find trillions—
                                                        




trillions—for corporations. This is all we can do for working families?” asks Senator 
Brown on the Senate floor.92 Senators Brown and Bennet introduce an amendment that 
would cut the corporate rate to 25% instead of 20% – still maintaining a ten-percent 
decrease – and greater expand the CTC while indexing it for inflation in exchange. The 
amendment fails 48-52. One would think that if Rubio and Lee were truly committed to 
helping children escape poverty at the cost of economic growth, they would endorse such 
an effort. In the end, however, both voted Nay.  
The TCJA passed, and the changes made to the child tax credit were substantial. It 
now exists as a $2,000-per-child credit that is partially refundable up to $1,400. The 
phase-out significantly increased, incorporating high-income earners into its target 
population. Married filers with incomes of $400,000 and single filers with incomes of 
$200,000 now receive the full value of the credit. Those with incomes below $2,500 are 
excluded from utilizing the credit, a dynamic that is truly counterintuitive to the original 
goal reducing child poverty. Unlike the cuts to corporations and high-income earners, 
these changes expire in 2025. It will cost $575 billion over the coming years, turning a 
once negligible tax credit into the nation’s largest anti-child poverty policy with over 
two-trillion dollars invested in it since its inception.  
Who benefitted in the end? According to conservative and moderate lawmakers, 
hardworking Americans did so. “Families need a break. How about that single mom with 
two children? I think she needs a break. Let’s give working moms, working dads with a 
couple of kids an extra couple thousand dollars to help make ends meet,” says Senator 
                                                        




Steve Daines (R-MT) when discussing the CTC on the Senate floor during TCJA 
debate.93 How about that single mom with two children? According to CBPP analysis, a 
single parent with two children earning the minimum wage received an average increase 
of $75. A married household with two children earning $400,000 annually, on the other 
hand, enjoyed a $4,000 increase.94 Judging from this outcome, a single parent with two 
children working a 40-hour-per-week minimum wage job does not work hard enough to 
fully partake in the country’s largest anti-child poverty effort. This is how the American 
welfare state, buttressed by a conservative-moderate coalition wielding neoliberal 
rhetoric, attempts to end child poverty.  
 The current political incentives for addressing child poverty through indirect 
spending virtually guarantee a continuation of inequity. Political actors are able to pass 
regressive economic agendas and spin them as pro-family to avoid being voted out of 
office. Meanwhile, interest groups and advocacy organizations on the left and the right 
endorse the child tax credit and the policy finds itself polling at incredible popularity. An 
original survey experiment explains why this is, finding that most Americans are ignorant 
to the inequities beneath the surface. Additionally, it provides testimony to the ability of 
political actors to use neoliberal rhetoric in characterizing target populations. This thesis 
now turns to exploring the role that public opinion plays in the neoliberal politics of 
indirect social spending. 
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Perceiving Welfare in America 
The previous case studies demonstrate that political actors rely upon neoliberal 
rhetoric when framing anti-child poverty policy. Is the public swayed by this strategy? 
Although there are several impediments to redistribution in the United States, the public 
opinion literature offers evidence of support for traditional social welfare initiatives. If 
this is true, then why do Americans accept such a meager approach to child poverty from 
their lawmakers? This chapter argues that social welfare preferences are heavily 
influenced by neoliberal framing tactics. Some scholars, however, contend that social 
welfare programs face strong public opposition overall. This thesis briefly engages with 
relevant literature, as well as alternative perspectives, before discussing its own 
viewpoint through an original survey experiment.  
 The United States pales in comparison to Western European nations with regard 
to economic redistribution. Alberto Alesina and colleagues argue that this is because the 
median voter in the U.S. is negatively disposed toward the poor, whereas the median 
European voter is positively disposed. Their explanation hinges in large part on race 
relations in America. Racial heterogeneity in the U.S. causes Americans to think of the 
poor as members of a different group than themselves. Meanwhile, the relative lack of 
racial heterogeneity among European nations allows Europeans to view the poor as 
members of their own social group. Alesina et al. find empirical evidence for such 




population that is black and the generosity of its welfare programs.95 Additionally, they 
find that support for welfare is lower among people who live near welfare recipients of a 
different race.96 The polarizing manner in which the U.S. distributes public assistance 
amplifies the consequences of these findings.  
 Rather than adopting broad universal welfare programs, American policymakers 
have historically relied on means-tested benefits. This creates a dividing line between 
lower- and middle-income earners, and such a division is detrimental to the electoral 
success of social welfare programs. Whereas a means-tested program excludes the 
middle-class, a universal program incorporates the median voter and thus receives 
stronger electoral defense. “To achieve an effective antipoverty policy you need to bridge 
groups rather than target the poor,” says Theda Skocpol, renowned sociologist and 
political scientist.97 Instead, the median voter is excluded from several traditional welfare 
programs in the United States, fostering a level of resentment toward beneficiaries of 
social policy. As discussed in Chapter 2, poverty in America is viewed through a racial 
lens. Taken together, social welfare preferences among the public are heavily influenced 
by the belief that beneficiaries belong to a group that is separate from one’s self. It will be 
shown through the coming survey experiment that this belief is an influential factor in the 
politics of the child tax credit.  
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 Despite reason to conclude that the public is distrustful of social welfare policy, 
there is growing evidence to suggest otherwise. Conventional wisdom, as perpetuated by 
Alesina and colleagues, holds that Americans view the poor negatively and the rich 
favorably. Spencer Piston, however, finds that this is not the case. His original survey 
reports that respondents are four to six times more likely to express sympathy towards the 
poor than towards the rich and half as likely to resent the poor as the rich.98 Piston finds 
that this is not a recent phenomenon, with similar attitudes dating back to 1993 and 
remaining constant throughout the welfare reform debates taking place during the 
1990s.99 As such, sympathy for the poor appears to be independent of traditional political 
values. Still, one may argue that this does not translate into support for direct spending 
programs.  
 This argument is contrary to a growing amount of evidence from the public 
opinion literature. Benjamin Page and Lawrence Jacobs, for example, find that strong 
majorities of the public support spending on education, job guarantees, a living wage, and 
government-run health care. Additionally, nearly 70% of Americans believe that money 
and wealth in the country should be more evenly distributed.100 Supermajorities support 
more government spending for early childhood education programs and public 
education.101 Moreover, nearly 80% support putting their own tax dollars towards public 
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assistance programs for the poor.102 The authors rely on these findings to warn that 
political outcomes are not necessarily reflective of public sentiment. 
However, one could raise the question of taxation in explaining why policies with 
broad support are not implemented. When taxpayers are forced to fund programs for non-
taxpayers, such an argument would hold, support for social welfare policy retreats. 
Vanessa Williamson claims that people perceive themselves as taxpayers but “doubt the 
taxpaying status of others.”103 The cost of payroll taxes, a topic of debate throughout the 
history of the child tax credit, and sales tax are largely overlooked by the public. Instead, 
the focus remains on income tax, serving to exclude the tax contributions of the poor. 
Williamson finds that politically engaged Republicans estimate that only half of 
American adults are taxpayers, suggesting that they harbor anti-welfare sentiments for 
people they believe to be non-hardworking.104 Page and Jacobs, as well as Piston, might 
argue in response that Americans nonetheless support direct spending initiatives and 
harbor positive sentiments towards the poor.  
This thesis connects these schools of thought. Although Americans are positively 
disposed towards the poor and social spending in general, politicians sow doubt with 
neoliberal values. As the following survey experiment demonstrates, neoliberal code 
words can be used to manipulate policy preferences. Such words call attention to the 
deservingness of beneficiaries, referencing their relationship with the market and their tax 
contributions. Williamson illustrates that Americans are hesitant to aid those who do not 
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pay taxes. Relying on neoliberal rhetoric, politicians are able to exploit this hesitation to 
undermine the safety net and pass regressive economic agendas. 
Survey Experiment: Methodology 
If public opinion contributes to the rise of the child tax credit and regressive 
economic legislation, then CTC reform is expected to increase public support for 
upwardly redistributive bills. Additionally, if the argument submitted by this thesis is 
correct, then public support for direct spending initiatives is expected to increase when 
beneficiaries are described using neoliberal code words. Alternatively, support for such 
programs is expected to decrease when such code words indicate a negative relationship 
with the market. Finally, drawing from the literature on social welfare attitudes, this 
thesis predicts that Americans view beneficiaries of the child tax credit as members of a 
social group different from themselves. The child tax credit is mistakenly perceived as a 
policy that most benefits the poor, allowing many Americans to falsely believe that those 
who pay little income tax disproportionately benefit.  
In testing these hypotheses, an original survey experiment, attached in full under 
the Appendix, was fielded through Qualtrics. The survey was completed by 850 
participants, all of whom are over the age of 18 and many of whom have children. Census 
quotas were used to ensure a representative sample with respect to age, race, and income. 
Half of participants identify as Democrats and half identify as Republicans. The main 
goal of this survey experiment is to determine whether the inclusion of the child tax 




Specifically, respondents were divided into four equal groups. Each group was 
primed with the same language on the CTC, which explained that the policy lifts and 
lessens poverty for children each year. One group was then asked whether they support 
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, given that it provided tax cuts to the affluent and corporations. 
A separate group was asked whether they support the same legislation using the same 
language, with the additional fact that the TCJA significantly expanded the CTC. The 
other two groups were asked these two identical questions, except one was told that 
Congressional Republicans and President Trump supported the TCJA while the other was 
not.  
 Additionally, the survey includes experimental questions targeted at measuring 
the influence of neoliberal code words. For example, four groups of respondents were 
asked whether they support a family allowance program. The control group was asked if 
they support such a program for families. The neoliberal condition group was asked if 
they support one for hardworking American families, and a welfare condition group was 
asked if they support an allowance program for unemployed parents. Finally, an income 
condition group was asked if they support such a program for low-income parents. 
Identical conditions were employed on a question regarding the expansion of the child 
tax credit, and it will be seen whether preferences vary across primes.  
 Two sample tests of differences between proportions were calculated to determine 
the significance of change across each condition and priming mechanism at α = 0.05. 
When presenting its results, this thesis will provide readers with the information needed 




experiment is designed to find evidence that might reinforce the narrative at hand. 
Namely, that political actors mask public policies in neoliberal rhetoric to reaffirm the 
cultural norm of hard work, undermine the U.S. welfare state, and pass regressive 
economic agendas.  
Survey Experiment: Results 
In line with expectations, this survey finds that the inclusion of CTC reform 
increases support for regressive economic legislation. Participants were given 
information on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) of 2017 and told that it primarily 
benefitted wealthy Americans and large corporations. Some participants, however, were 
also primed on language describing the child tax credit and told that the TCJA 
significantly expanded the policy. An additional two groups were presented with the 
exact same language, except they were also informed that President Trump and 
Congressional Republicans provided most of the support for the TCJA. This latter 
dynamic is intended to reveal the effects of CTC inclusion on policy preferences when 
participants are given partisan cues. Ultimately, the inclusion of the CTC drastically 
increased support for the TCJA. 
 Overall, priming participants with the CTC increased support for the TCJA by 21-
percentage points. The bill went from having the public almost evenly divided to 
witnessing a super majority of support, with 75% in the CTC group supporting its 
passage. Importantly, this effect was strongest among Democrats, whose support 
increased from 40% to 64% when told that the act expands the CTC. Even when told that 




Support for the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act, with President Trump 






Democrats 40.2 63.9 +23.7 *** 
Republicans 71.0 88.3 +17.3 ** 
Total 53.5 74.9 +21.4 ** 
Table 1. Participants were asked if they support the TCJA. They were told that President Trump and 
Congressional Republicans passed the TCJA. Some were primed with the bill’s effect on the CTC. Total 
count: 211. Democrat count: 108. Republican count: 94. Other party count: 9. Significance codes: ‘***’ 
0.0001 ‘**’ 0.001 ‘*’ 0.01 ‘’ 0.05.  
 
 
Support for the Tax Cuts & Jobs Act, without President Trump 






Democrats 43.0 65.7 +22.7*** 
Republicans 66.0 87.6 +21.6** 
Total 53.5 76.5 +23.0** 
Table 2. Participants were asked if they support the TCJA. President Trump and Congressional 
Republicans were not mentioned. Some were primed with the bill’s effect on the CTC. Total count: 211. 
Democrat count: 108. Republican count: 94. Other party count: 9. Significance codes: ‘***’ 0.0001 ‘**’ 
0.001 ‘*’ 0.01 ‘’ 0.05. 
 
 
signaled approval when the child tax credit was primed. These results are statistically 
significant (p < 0.01) and summarized in Tables 1 and 2. These findings strongly suggest 
that neoliberal indirect spending policies allow political actors to increase public support 
for regressive economic legislation. Additionally, they indicate that such policies 
facilitate broad coalitions of moderate and conservative actors. This explains the 
bipartisan support that emerged during each instance of evolution throughout the history 
of the CTC. The inclusion of the CTC transformed an entire political party from being 




 Participants were additionally asked whether they support a range of policy 
proposals, some real and some hypothetical. Four groups were randomly assigned to 
different priming conditions. One group served as the control, having been told that 
“families” would benefit from the policy proposal at hand. A second group received a 
neoliberal prime, having been told that “hardworking American families” would benefit. 
This phrase was chosen because it was used by many MOCs to describe target 
populations during each instance of CTC reform. A third group received an income 
prime, having been told that “low-income parents” would benefit. Finally, a fourth group 
received a welfare prime, having been told that “unemployed parents” would benefit. 
Essentially, this question allows us to see if code words can effectively isolate specific 
target populations and thus cause variance in policy preferences. 
As illustrated through Table 3, the child tax credit was supported by 
supermajorities across each group. Regardless of which priming mechanism was 
deployed, the CTC retained robust bipartisan support from the public. Differences in 
overall support and among Democrats are present, but largely negligible. Among 
Republicans, however, there exists statistically significant differences in support between 
the welfare and neoliberal primes (a difference of 15 points with p < 0.01) and between 
the income and neoliberal primes (a difference of 10 points with p < 0.025). Although a 
noticeable difference of seven points in Republican support exists between the control 
and neoliberal prime, it is statistically non-significant (p > 0.05). Nonetheless, the 





Support for Expanding the Child Tax Credit 












Democrats 82.6 95.1 94.5 96.2 
Republicans 75.5 79.2 82.6 89.5 
Total 78.9 86.9 89.7 92.9 
Table 3. Participants were asked if they support expanding the CTC. Some were primed with different 
target populations. Total, Democrat, Republican welfare count, respectively: 213, 109, 98. Total, Democrat, 
Republican income count, respectively: 213, 102, 106. Total, Democrat, Republican control count, 
respectively: 213, 109, 92. Total, Democrat, Republican neoliberal count, respectively: 211, 105, 95. 
 
One could argue, however, that these differences do not amount to anything in the 
real world. This thesis expected such a finding from seeking opinions on the CTC, since 
the credit is one of the most popular contemporary policies. When theoretical policy 
proposals are instead offered, distinct variations in preferences become clear. As 
emphasized in Beyond Rhetoric, the United States remains one of the lone Western 
democracies not to have a family allowance program. Divided into priming groups 
identical to the CTC question, participants were asked if they would support such a 
program. Results are summarized in Table 4. 
 Overall, and perhaps surprisingly, large majorities of Americans support a family 
allowance program regardless of who benefits. Even an allowance program for 
unemployed families, which would be expected to receive resistance, retains support 
from 64% of Americans and a majority of Republicans. There exists significant 





Support for a Family Allowance Program 












Democrats 69.9 70.5 72.5 82.7 
Republicans 55.3 52.2 47.2 67.7 
Total 63.8 61.0 60.1 74.9 
Table 4. Participants were asked if they would support a family allowance program. Some were primed 
with different target populations. Total, Democrat, Republican welfare count, respectively: 213, 113, 94. 
Total, Democrat, Republican income count, respectively: 213, 112, 92. Total, Democrat, Republican 
control count, respectively: 213, 102, 106. Total, Democrat, Republican neoliberal count, respectively: 211, 
98, 99. 
 
increases support for allowance programs overall by 15 points (p < 0.001) compared to 
the control group. Among Republicans in particular, a 20 point difference emerges, 
causing an evenly split party to suddenly gain consensus (p < 0.01). Again, Republicans 
appear to be most influenced by different priming mechanisms.  
Still, one may argue that these changes do not actually matter realistically, given 
that a majority of the public supports an allowance program in each case. Keep in mind, 
though, that only a couple of words were changed throughout each instance. Just one 
word, in several cases, influenced support by more than 10 percentage points. In real life 
scenarios, political actors will launch information campaigns that heavily characterize 
target populations both visually and verbally. Conservative actors may compound the 
welfare prime, for example, with one of immigration, claiming that allowance programs 
would benefit unemployed mothers and illegal aliens. If only one word creates significant 





Support for a Universal Breakfast Program 
 No Mention of Taxes Told Taxes Would Increase 
Democrats 91.7 90.5 
Republicans 76.6 72.0 
Total 83.8 81.2 
Table 5. Participants were asked if they would support a universal breakfast program. Half were told that 
they would pay more in taxes for it, and half were not. Total, Democrat, Republican taxes count, 
respectively: 425, 221, 182. Total, Democrat, Republican non-taxes count, respectively: 425, 204, 209.  
 
Political pundits argue that one of the obstacles to direct spending programs is the 
lack of clear public opinion. With regard to child poverty, this is not the case. The public 
supports direct spending initiatives to lift children out of poverty, with Democrats and 
Republicans alike aligning in supermajorities. Not only do they support a universal 
family allowance program, but they also support feeding children. Participants were 
asked whether they would support a universal breakfast program wherein every child K-
12 receives a free breakfast at school. A stunning 84% of the public supports such an 
initiative, including 77% of Republicans. One could claim that this does not prove 
anything, however, because people support direct spending programs conceptually but do 
not want to pay for them when push comes to shove. This, too, is incorrect. When told 
that they would pay more taxes to fund a universal program, virtually no change 
occurred. A full 82% of overall participants and 72% of Republicans supported it. These 
results are summarized in Table 5.  
Why, then, do political actors not pursue direct spending solutions to child 
poverty? The answer lies within the neoliberal mindset and the politics of indirect 




The Perceived Beneficiaries of the Child Tax Credit  
 Those who make 
less than you 
Those who make 
the same as you 
Those who make 
more than you 
Upper-Income 45.6 10.7 43.7 
Middle-Income 51.9 25.7 22.5 
Lower-Income 48.9 29.8 21.3 
Table 6. Participants were asked whom they believed benefitted most from the child tax credit. Upper-
incomes were $150,000+, middle-income $50,000-150,000, and lower-incomes $0-50,000. Total, upper, 
middle, and lower counts, respectively: 850, 103, 432, 315.  
 
families is conditioned on their productivity vis-à-vis the market. Neoliberal code words, 
as proven by this survey experiment, act as powerful tools for political actors to separate 
groups into those who deserve and those who do not deserve aid. Subsequently, the 
public views social welfare policy in an “us versus them” mentality. People are seen not 
as human beings but as economic actors, and the public rewards those who are successful 
on this terrain and punishes those who are not.  
Take the CTC itself as an example. The benefits are disproportionately skewed 
and upwardly redistributive, with the highest income quartile earning more on average 
than the lowest income quartile. However, when asked whom participants believe most 
benefits from the policy, a full 50% say those who make less than they do. Even among 
low-income earners, who benefit the least from the policy, a full 80% answer that either 
those who make less than or about the same as themselves benefit the most. These results 
are categorized by income group and summarized in Table 6.  
This is telling for a number of reasons. The child tax credit is cloaked in 
neoliberal rhetoric and supported by a vast majority of people; still, most Americans 




Americans believe that it helps those in the same income class as them, meaning that 
three-quarters of Americans perceive the credit as helping other people. The perception 
of another receiving help while you yourself are not is a powerful source of resentment 
for social welfare policy, and it is a feeling that political actors on both sides of the aisle 
can exploit.  
Finally, this survey determined whether Americans noticed the changes made to 
the child tax credit by the TCJA. The Trump Administration and Congressional 
Republicans routinely cite CTC expansion as a hallmark of their legislative prowess, 
despite the inequities discussed throughout Chapter 2. Participants were simply asked if 
they noticed an increase, decrease, or no difference in the value of their CTC from tax 
years 2017 to 2018. Demographic questions allowed participants to be filtered by the 
number of children they claimed in 2017 relative to 2018. Of those who report an 
increase in CTC benefits, 90% claimed more children in 2018 than they did in 2017. This 
implies that its value increased by virtue of claiming another child, not necessarily by 
virtue of CTC reform. Additionally, two-thirds of those reporting an increase are upper-
income respondents.  
Whereas a supermajority of upper-income households experienced an increase in 
CTC benefits, a majority of low-income households experienced either a decrease or no 
difference in CTC benefits. Middle-income households are split on whether they noticed 
an increase in benefits. When filtering out respondents who did not claim the CTC and 
those who claimed a different number of children from year to year, 62% did not notice 




dependents in 2017 and 2018 did not notice an increase in their CTC after reform. It can 
be said that the average American did not notice the effects of the 2017 CTC reform, 
which Republicans relied heavily upon to make the TCJA appear fairer to workers. 
Essentially, the distribution of the largest anti-child poverty policy in the country is 
relatively unknown to the public and most Americans do not notice changes to its size on 
their tax forms.   
In summary, neoliberal code words powerfully influence public support for social 
welfare policies. Republican individuals are particularly attracted to policies cloaked in 
neoliberal language. Additionally, regressive economic legislation is significantly more 
likely to be supported if it includes a social welfare oriented tax expenditure. This tactic 
is useful for dividing Democratic support for legislation, as the inclusion of social welfare 
policy splits an otherwise unified party. Moreover, direct spending solutions for child 
poverty receive robust bipartisan support from the public. This support, however, may 
prove weak if Americans perceive beneficiaries to belong to social or income groups 
other than themselves. Universal social welfare programs avoid this breakdown in 
support, as they bridge the lower- and middle-classes and allow everyone to have a stake 
in the welfare state. Finally, most Americans are ignorant to the child tax credit. Despite 
being the largest U.S. anti-child poverty policy, the distribution of the CTC is unknown 
to most Americans. A majority of the public does not know who benefits from the policy, 
and most did not notice any effects on their personal lives from the largest expansion 







Child poverty is a crisis in America. Half of all children live in low-income 
households and one out five lives beneath the poverty line, a measurement that 
underestimates true levels of poverty. Nearly six million children live in extreme poverty, 
defined as annual incomes at half the poverty line. Three-quarters of poor children are 
children of color.105 Our youngest children – infants, toddlers and preschoolers between 
the ages of zero and five – suffer the highest poverty rates at time when the brain is just 
developing.106 Social programs, including the Child Health Insurance Program (CHIP) 
and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), have been gutted. Public school 
funding has been gutted. The children of today may be the first generation to grow up 
worse off than their parents. In the world’s richest country, kids are too often lacking 
hope for what their futures can become.  
 It does not have to be this way. The solutions to child poverty are straightforward 
and can be implemented tomorrow, if desired. When children are hungry, the solution is 
to feed them. Eight out of ten Americans support doing so through a universal breakfast 
program. When parents cannot make ends meet, the solution is to put more money into 
their pockets. The United States House of Representatives passed a bill increasing the 
federal minimum wage to $15-an-hour in July of 2019. Moreover, a sizeable majority of 
the public supports a family allowance program so that children are not left behind during 
                                                        
105 Dawson, “Child Poverty.” 




times of economic strain. If politicians wish to continue with indirect spending solutions 
and expand the child tax credit, they can do so meaningfully and make it fully refundable 
to all parents regardless of income. The solutions are at our fingertips. They are common 
sense. The resources needed to implement them are available. All that is missing are the 
necessary leadership and priorities required to use them.  
 Political actors often cry bankruptcy when forced to engage in direct social 
spending. Meanwhile, over two-trillion dollars have been funneled into the tax code on 
the child tax credit alone. The nation’s largest anti-child poverty policy provides more 
benefits to upper-income households than to lower-income households and no benefits to 
households in extreme poverty. This will not end child poverty. Why, then, do our 
policymakers continue to throw money at it? Because neoliberal values enable them to do 
so without consequence. Neoliberalism as a public policymaking tool allows political 
actors to garner support for regressive economic agendas, separate target populations 
based on their economic worth, and undermine the goals of American social policy. It is 
apparent through the history of the CTC that political actors routinely use impoverished 
children as bargaining chips in pursuit of a tax breaks for the privileged.  
 One could disagree. Christopher Howard, a leading scholar on the hidden welfare 
state whose work in large part inspired this thesis, does so. Howard claims, “It is 
tempting to imagine that Republicans accepted a new benefit for families with children as 
the price of winning approval for tax cuts aimed at businesses and the rich. That is not 




the child tax credit into the political landscape to serve electoral interests.107 Such a 
reality directly contradicts the account of this thesis, as well as what actually occurred. 
The National Commission on Children, a bipartisan coalition of elected officials and 
societal actors, innovated the child tax credit, not Republican actors. Conservatives and 
moderates alike hijacked a policy intended to benefit all children and turned it into one 
that benefits some children. At every step of the way, groups of lawmakers relied upon 
the CTC as a false representation of fairness in legislation that would disproportionately 
provide tax relief for the upper class.  
 This is not to say that the child tax credit does not lessen poverty for children 
across the country. In fact, it has decreased the child poverty rate significantly over the 
years. Nonetheless, the problem remains. It will remain until politicians are willing to 
separate child poverty from political strategy and the need for short-term economic 
growth. Rather than passing a direct spending program that will provide immediate relief 
for struggling families, Congress continues to invest in a one-time annual payment 
through the tax code as part of an agenda labelled as pro-worker and pro-growth. This is 
the legacy of the neoliberal mindset – everything, including aid to impoverished children, 
must relate to economic growth. Such a mindset is reinforced through electoral 
incentives, as found by the survey experiment included in this thesis. Until discussion on 
the economic costs of acting on child poverty succumbs to the human costs of not acting 
on child poverty, these dynamics will persist.  
                                                        




 It is important to note, however, that this thesis is not advocating for Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families. The program itself is reflective of a neoliberal paternalist 
approach to governing the poor and holds serious inequities. When discussing the 
differences in AFDC benefits across states, President Nixon says, “No child is worth 
more in one state than in another state.”108 Ironically, the CTC similarly serves to 
undermine Nixon’s words, albeit more implicitly. Although TANF has fundamental 
flaws, it illustrates the potential for policymakers to place direct cash benefits in the 
pockets of American families. The program is a reminder that we can give our children 
much more than a tax credit, but it is not an ideal model off which to base anti-poverty 
policy design.  
 Ultimately, the neoliberal lens through which child poverty is viewed places a 
dollar amount on the head of each child. In 2017, some children were worth $75 while 
others were worth $4,000. Many were worthless. While this aligns with the American 
norm of hard work, it directly contradicts the American principle of equality. The politics 
of indirect spending allow much of these factors to go unnoticed, with most of the public 
being unaware of the CTC’s upwardly regressive distribution and buying into the largely 
symbolic crusade against child poverty. By calling attention to the neoliberal 
underpinnings of social policymaking in the United States, one can move forward with 
real solutions to social crises. Our children deserve nothing short of a systematic 
upheaval of poverty, and our future depends on it.  
 
                                                        




APPENDIX: Survey Experiment as Fielded 
I. IRB Exempt Human Research Consent Statement 
1. The purpose of this academic research study is to better understand 
preferences towards the child tax credit. Participation is completely voluntary, 
and participants can stop the survey at any time. 
 
No more than 10 minutes will be needed to complete the survey. You will be 
asked whether you support a range of policy proposals, some of which are 
hypothetical. Additionally, you will be asked basic demographic questions. 
The purpose of such questions is to establish any patterns of support for 
preferences among different populations. None of these questions can or will 
be used to obtain your identity. 
 
All responses are anonymous and confidential, but your panel provider will 
provide your ID numbers for payment. The determination and distribution of 
payment will be under the jurisdiction of your panel provider. The main risk 
of allowing us to use and store your information for research is a potential loss 
of privacy. To protect your privacy, your information will remain anonymous. 
This anonymity is protected by the system, which only allows us access to 
your IDs that have no other shared information associated with them. 
 
By participating in this survey, you will be advancing the social science 
literature surrounding social welfare policy. Such literature needs a public 
perspective, and it would benefit greatly from your participation. 
 
Please contact Bayley Connors, the Principle Investigator, at bayleyc@bu.edu 
if you have any questions. Bayley Connors is a student at Boston University, 
and his Faculty Advisor is Cathie Jo Martin, PhD, who can be reached at 
cjmartin@bu.edu. Boston University requires all university research dealing 
with people to conform to the high ethical standards of the University. You 
may obtain further information about your rights as a research subject by 
calling the BU CRC IRB Office at 617-358-6115.  
 











II. Experimental Questions (Only one lettered version appears in each 
survey) 
 
1. Each year, the child tax credit prevents more than one million children from 
falling into poverty and lessens poverty for an additional six million children.  
 
A. Suppose Congress passed a bill that would increase the value of the child 
tax credit for parents. Would you support this bill? 
B. Suppose Congress passed a bill that would increase the value of the child 
tax credit for hardworking American families. Would you support this bill? 
C. Suppose Congress passed a bill that would increase the value of the child 
tax credit for low-income parents. Would you support this bill? 
D. Suppose Congress passed a bill that would increase the value of the child 
tax credit for unemployed parents. Would you support this bill? 
a. Strongly Support 
b. Support 
c. Slightly Support 
d. Slightly Oppose 
e. Oppose 
f. Strongly Oppose 
 
2. A. In 2017, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was passed. President Trump and 
Congressional Republicans provided most of the support for this bill. The bill 
cost $1.9 trillion in revenue, the majority of which went to wealthy Americans 
and corporations in the form of tax cuts. However, it also doubled the value of 
the child tax credit. This kept millions of children from falling below the 
poverty line.  
 
B. In 2017, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was passed. President Trump and 
Congressional Republicans provided most of the support for this bill. This 
cost $1.9 trillion in revenue, the majority of which went to wealthy Americans 
and corporations in the form of tax cuts. 
 
C. In 2017, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was passed. This cost $1.9 trillion in 
revenue, the majority of which went to wealthy Americans and corporations in 
the form of tax cuts. However, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act also doubled the 
value of the child tax credit. This kept millions of children from falling below 




D. In 2017, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act was passed. This cost $1.9 trillion in 
revenue, the majority of which went to wealthy Americans and corporations in 
the form of tax cuts. 
 
Do you support the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act? 
 
a. Strongly Support 
b. Support 
c. Slightly Support 
d. Slightly Oppose  
e. Oppose 
f. Strongly Oppose 
 
3. A. Would you support a universal breakfast program that provides a free 
breakfast to every child K-12? 
 
B. Would you support a universal breakfast program that provides a free 





4. A. Would you support a universal child allowance program, wherein families 
receive an annual stipend based on the number of children they have? 
 
B. Would you support a child allowance program, wherein hardworking 
American families receive an annual stipend based on the number of children 
they have? 
 
C. Would you support a child allowance program, wherein low-income 
parents receive an annual stipend based on the number of children they have? 
 
D. Would you support a child allowance program, wherein unemployed 








III. General Questions (Each survey includes these) 
1. Did you claim the child tax credit for tax year 2017? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t remember 
 
2. Did you claim the child tax credit for tax year 2018? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
c. Don’t remember  
 






e. More than three 
 






e. More than three 
 
5. Did you claim more, less, or the same number of child dependents in tax year 
2018 than in tax year 2017? 
a. More 
b. Less 
c. The same 







6. Would you say that the value of your child tax credit has increased, decreased, 
or remained the same over the past few years?  
a. Increased 
b. Decreased 
c. Remained the same 
d. Don’t remember 
  
7. Whom do you think benefits most from the child tax credit? 
a. Those who make more than you 
b. Those who make about the same as you 
c. Those who make less than you 
 
8. In as many words as you would like, please list and/or describe what you 
believe are the largest costs of raising children. (Free response) 
 
9. One out of five American children under the age of six lives in poverty, and 
half live in low-income households. In as many words as you would like, 
please list and/or describe what you believe the government should do to lift 
children out of poverty, if anything. (Free response) 
 
IV. Demographics 
10. What category below includes your age? 
a. 18 – 24 
b. 25 – 34  
c. 35 – 44 
d. 45 – 54 
e. 55 – 64 
f. 65+ 
 
11. What is your gender? 
a. Male 
b. Female 
c. Other (please specify):  
 
12. Are you now married? 
a. Married 




13. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree 
you have received? 
a. Less than high school degree 
b. High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED) 
c. Some college but no degree 
d. Bachelor degree 
e. Graduate degree 
 
14. How much total combined money did all members of your household earn last 
year? 
a. Less than $25,000 
b. $25,000 – $50,000  
c. $50,000 – $75,000  
d. $75,000 – $100,000 
e. $100,000 - $150,000 
f. $150,000 - $200,000 
g. Greater than $200,000 
 
15. Which, if any, best describes your partisan identity? 
a. Strong Democrat 
b. Democrat 
c. Independent lean Democrat  
d. Independent 
e. Independent lean Republican 
f. Republican 
g. Strong Republican 
h. Other (please specify):  
 
16. What race do you identify with? 
a. White 
b. Black or African-American 
c. American Indian or Alaskan Native 
d. Asian 
e. Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander  
f. From multiple races 
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